Locarno had unlocked the door to a new period of peace in Europe. The western powers found the subsequent path of conciliation sometimes stony, but nevertheless manageable and – at least at first – seemingly devoid of insurmountable obstacles. The close personal relationship between the three Locarnites, Briand, Chamberlain and Stresemann, and the informal ‘Geneva tea parties’ where they discussed politics, contributed to the new confidence. Europe did its best to overcome the divisions of the First World War.

The Soviet Union, however, felt like an outcast. From the moment they learned that Germany was to sign an agreement with the western powers, the Russians firmly believed that Locarno was a British conspiracy against them. British aversion to Bolshevism was no secret, but this did not result in an openly hostile policy. Neither Austen Chamberlain nor other Foreign Office officials were fundamentally concerned about the ideological drivers behind Moscow’s policy. The Foreign Office had pragmatically decided that the best way of ‘taming’ the Russians was to ignore them. London would wait until the need for diplomatic and economic contacts brought Moscow to reason.

While the western powers celebrated the success of Locarno, Soviet paranoia about a capitalist front grew. In the European capitals, Soviet diplomats complained that Britain was seeking to isolate Russia. Chamberlain’s categorical assurances that there was ‘not an atom of foundation’ for these allegations had little effect. According to the report of Peters, the counsellor, dated early December 1925, the Soviet press was finding evidence of anti-Soviet designs everywhere and the Kremlin had still not made up its mind on how to respond to Locarno.

Peters’s observation was not quite correct. Soviet Russia was shaken by the domestic struggle for power between Stalin and Trotsky. At the same time it was engaged in a fundamental debate about the future of communist ideology. The two conflicting positions were the continuation of the Leninist principle of world revolution on the one hand, and its replacement by Stalin’s concept of ‘socialism in one country’ on the other. Stalin eventually won this battle. Yet the resulting temporary instability on the domestic scene, and Moscow’s fear that Russia’s security was endangered by a capitalist front that possibly linked the security of Europe and Asia, seemed to demand foreign political action from the Kremlin.