This chapter focuses on the bankruptcy goals in China. It mainly explores the theoretical underpinnings of the bankruptcy goals. The author argues that the bankruptcy law is not only a procedural law, but also a substantive law. The bankruptcy law not only aims to realise such substantial rights under non-bankruptcy laws, but has its own value as a market institution: to provide fair protection to market players – creditors, debtor and other stakeholders – to set the order of priority, distribute the financial risks of the failure of the debtor fairly and uphold the value of the rule of law in bankruptcy procedures. Undoubtedly, the bankruptcy goals bear distinct imprints of China’s socialist market economy. The socialist market economy in China has distinguished itself from capitalist market economies in two key respects: (1) a strong public sector and (2) a policy of strong state intervention. These special characteristics have some implications for bankruptcy goals in China, i.e. the need to secure the strong dominance of the public sector, allow government intervention in enterprise bankruptcies and protect the interests of stakeholders, especially the workers.