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3 - A reversal of fortune: blame games and framing contests after the 3/11 terrorist attacks in Madrid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2010

By
José A. Olmeda
Edited by
Arjen Boin ,
Allan McConnell  and
Paul 't Hart
José A. Olmeda
Affiliation:
Spanish Open University, Madrid
Arjen Boin
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
Allan McConnell
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
Paul 't Hart
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
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Summary

Introduction

With only 3 days to go, Prime Minister José María Aznar and his ruling Popular Party (PP) appeared certain of victory in the general elections to be held on 14 March 2004. Pushing a firm antiterrorist agenda – read: anti-ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) – and conservative fiscal policies, Aznar's PP held a comfortable 5 percent lead in the polls over the socialist contenders. Aznar's designated successor (Aznar had announced his retirement), former Interior Minister and Vice Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, thus seemed a near certainty to continue the 8-year-old PP government.

The attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid changed all that. A series of bomb explosions on four trains heading to one of Madrid's main stations killed 192 persons and wounded 1,430. In addition to the horror and grief caused by the onslaught, Spain witnessed a stunning political shift. The socialist opposition led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero won the elections just three days later.

Crises are often thought to foster solidarity, a phenomenon commonly known as the ‘rally-’round-the-flag' effect. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, President George W. Bush's hitherto meagre job approval rating shot up 35 to 40 percentage points. Likewise, the public's appreciation for Tony Blair's leadership as prime minister rose (on a ten-point scale) from 5.07 to 5.55 after the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005. The fate of the Spanish government thus sharply contrasts with the fates of its western partners.

Type
Chapter
Information
Governing after Crisis
The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning
 , pp. 62 - 84
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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