The reluctant countries are different from the rich, enthusiastic nations examined in Chapter 3 for two reasons. One is to do with interests. Reluctant countries have other priorities than spending their own resources to slow global warming. The other reason is low and variable administrative capacity. These countries are “developing” in part because their administrative systems are weak, fragmented, and often erratic in their functioning. In some sectors of the economy, the government has mercurial control – for example, most energy systems in the largest developing countries are directly owned by governments and staffed with government employees. Yet in other parts of the economy, the government is barely able to monitor behavior and implement policy. In such settings, even with strong inducements it is hard for governments to make credible commitments about policies they will reliably implement at home.

Such problems are hardly new in international affairs. Diplomats fix them in two ways. One is by creating incentives that lead reluctant nations to rethink their interests. Those incentives include sticks (e.g., trade sanctions) and carrots (e.g., subsidies for projects that reduce emissions and for administrative capacity-building). I start this chapter by looking at the sticks and carrots that have been deployed so far and showing how they can be made more effective. Sticks are difficult to use because they create many risks. Trade sanctions against countries that don't mitigate emissions can easily touch off broader trade wars that leave people much worse off. Politically, carrots are easier to offer.