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Foreword

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2021

George Di Giovanni
Affiliation:
McGill University, Montréal
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Summary

This part of the Logic which contains the Doctrine of the Concept and constitutes the third part of the whole is also issued under the particular title of System of Subjective Logic. This is for the convenience of those friends of this science who, of the materials covered by logic commonly so called, normally take a greater interest in those treated here than in the first two parts. – For these earlier parts I could claim the indulgence of the fair critic because of the dearth of previous work that could have afforded me some support, the materials and a guide on how to proceed. In the case of the present part, I can rather claim this indulgence for the opposite reason; for there already exists for the logic of the concept a fully ready and wellentrenched, one may even say ossified, material, and the task is to make it fluid again, to revive the concept in such a dead matter. To build a new city in a devastated land has its difficulties, even if there is no lack of material at hand; but even greater are the obstacles, of a different kind, when the task is to give a new layout to an ancient and solidly constructed city, with established rights of ownership and domicile; one must also decide, among other things, not to make use of much otherwise valued stock. –

But above all, it is the greatness of the subject matter itself that may be adduced as an excuse for the imperfection in execution. For what subject matter is there for cognition more sublime than truth itself? – Yet there is no escaping the doubt that it is this very subjectmatter that needs excuse when the sense in which Pilate put the question, “What is truth?,” comes tomind, uttering it as he did, in thewords of the poet, “ … with the courtier’smien that myopically yet smiling damns the cause of the earnest soul.” Pilate’s question then carries the meaning, which we may view as a moment of politeness, together with its reminder, that the goal of discovering the truth is, as everyone knows, something that has been given up, long since set aside with a shrug; that the unattainableness of truth is recognized also by philosophers and professional logicians.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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