This volume brings together my recent work in the philosophy of mind. All of the essays were completed within the last ten years, although “On Knowing One's Own Mind” is a descendant of an essay I first presented in 1981. All except two have been previously published, the exceptions being “Intrasubjective/Intersubjective” and “Unity of Consciousness and Consciousness of Unity.” The version of “Moore's Paradox and Self- Knowledge” included here is a substantial revision of the previously published version. Only very minor changes have been made in the other essays, although in some cases new notes have been added.

While all of the essays in the volume deal in one way or other with “the first-person perspective,” the title essay, as distinct from its title, is in some ways unrepresentative of the collection as a whole. It is concerned with the idea that what we can conceive or imagine from the first-person perspective is revealing about the nature of mental phenomena in a way in which what we can conceive or imagine in other ways is not; and since it is critical of that idea, it might be seen as downplaying the philosophical importance of the first-person perspective. But as I say in that essay, I have always held that an essential part of the philosophical task is to give an account of mind that makes intelligible the perspective mental subjects have on their own mental lives. And the other essays in the collection are devoted to this task.

One part of the task is the elucidation of the distinctive sort of knowledge people have of their own mental states.