Nietzsche questions the value of morality. As he does so, I argue, he provides a rich and psychologically complex account of calculable responsibility's presence within morality and its way of narrowing our responsibility, of narrowing what demands a response from us. Recognizing that Nietzsche's famous critique of morality is, in large part, a critique of calculable responsibility makes clear a thought that bears repeating, especially given common perceptions of Nietzsche's thought. By calling into question the value of morality, Nietzsche is not inviting us to be irresponsible. His problem with morality is not that it asks too much of us but rather that it asks too little and is the primary way we avoid our responsibility. If I can show that Nietzsche wishes to broaden our responsibility rather than help us escape it, then I will have gone far toward questioning the conflation of being moral with being responsible, which is one of the most important tasks of this study. Perhaps many of us think we already fully grasp the potential disconnect between being moral and being responsible and are in some way beyond morality. Part of what I hope to show is that insofar as calculable responsibility still captivates us we are not yet beyond morality, and indeed may never be entirely beyond it.

In making my arguments, I do not deny that in his writings Nietzsche appears to endorse or at least admire some horrific and cruel practices (such as a caste system). My purpose here is not to sanitize or democratize Nietzsche. Instead, I want to bring to light those often subtle aspects of Nietzsche's thought that focus on morality's curtailment of our responsibility and that seek to deepen our responsibility.