Why re-examine the Cuban missile crisis?

Why choose the Cuban missile crisis, yet again, as the case study on which to develop theory?

There are both theoretical and methodological reasons. Although cases may be selected because they are typical of some category, the events of October 1962 were surely not typical of anything, and we must surely hope that twenty-first-century politics will not change that fact.

A case may be chosen because it lies at the extreme end of some distribution, so providing an important account of the limits of some critical independent variable. This, it will be argued below, turns out to be true, in part, of the missile crisis. If the theory presented here can be warranted, it would enable us to say something about the further reaches of the distribution of likely cases on at least some relevant dimensions (see Figure 1.1 above).

An atypical case may be chosen because it powerfully reveals something of wider significance not previously understood (Yin, 1994, 40). This can also be argued to be true of the Cuban case, if the theory turns out to be sound.

Cases may also be chosen for reanalysis if they have been used in earlier studies to develop major alternative theories, if reanalysis might expose those earlier theories’ limitations and make the case for considering another theory (cf. Gerring, 2007, 150, on ‘theoretical prominence’ as a case selection rationale). Allison’s (1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 2nd edn) Essence of decision gave the missile crisis huge importance in political science; it has subsequently been used by advocates of prospect theory, psychoanalytic theories, several theories in individual political psychology, social construction approaches, historical analogy theory,and many others.