Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Epigraph
- Chapter 1 On political judgement
- Chapter 2 The need for richer explanation
- Chapter 3 A Durkheimian theoretical framework
- Chapter 4 October 1962, before and after
- Chapter 5 The Khrushchev régime
- Chapter 6 The Kennedy administration
- Chapter 7 The Castro revolutionary régime
- Chapter 8 Implications
- Chapter 9 Coda
- Notes
- References
- Index
Chapter 9 - Coda
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Epigraph
- Chapter 1 On political judgement
- Chapter 2 The need for richer explanation
- Chapter 3 A Durkheimian theoretical framework
- Chapter 4 October 1962, before and after
- Chapter 5 The Khrushchev régime
- Chapter 6 The Kennedy administration
- Chapter 7 The Castro revolutionary régime
- Chapter 8 Implications
- Chapter 9 Coda
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
The night of 23 October 1962 was a late one for Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, for a different reason than that which had kept him awake into the small hours on the previous night. For when Kennedy's broadcast of 22 October was transmitted, it was 1 am, now the 23rd, in Moscow, and the chairman had remained awake to find out what the US administration's reaction would be to its discovery of his Cuban adventure. Later in the week of the crisis, too (26 October), he would sleep a few hours in the office to handle urgent decisions.
After having written his reply to Kennedy's announcement of the blockade and demand for the missiles to be withdrawn, Khrushchev decided to honour an engagement. He probably could have got out of it, had he been willing to risk having to explain why a touchy ally should not take offence. A delegation from the Romanian Communist Party headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was visiting Moscow, and Khrushchev agreed to be their host in a visit to the Bolshoi Theatre. Accompanying Khrushchev were Mikoyan and several other members of the Praesidium, including Kozlov (still thought at this stage to be the heir apparent to the positions of chairman and first secretary), Kosygin and Brezhnev. One reason for honouring the engagement might have been to suggest to Muscovites that all was calm and that no one was still needed at their Kremlin desk (Khrushchev, 2000, 563).
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- Information
- Explaining Political Judgement , pp. 290 - 294Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011