Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 7
  • Print publication year: 2012
  • Online publication date: July 2012

Chapter 9 - Team reasoning, framing and cooperation

References

Anderson, E. (2001). Unstrapping the straitjacket of ‘preference’: a comment on Amartya Sen’s contributions to philosophy and economics. Economics and Philosophy 17, 2138.
Bacharach, M. (1997). ‘We’ equilibria: a variable frame theory of cooperation. Working paper, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford.
Bacharach, M. (1998). Preferenze razionali e descrizioni. In M. Galarotti and G. Gambetta (eds.), Epistemologia et Economia. Bologna: CLUEB.
Bacharach, M. (1999). Interactive team reasoning: a contribution to the theory of cooperation. Research in Economics 53, 117147.
Bacharach, M. (2000). Scientific synopsis. Unpublished manuscript (describing initial plans for Beyond Individual Choice (Bacharach 2006)).
Bacharach, M. (2006). Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and frames in game theory. Princeton University Press.
Bardsley, N. (2007). On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy. Synthese 157(2), 18.
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Binmore, K. (1994). Game Theory and the Social Contract, volume 1. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Bolton, G. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC – a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166193.
Broome, J. (1991). Weighing Goods. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Colman, A., Pulford, B. and Rose, J. (2007). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica 128, 387397.
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817868.
Gilbert, M. P. (1987). On Social Facts. New York: Routledge.
Gold, N. (forthcoming). Framing and self-control. In N. Levy (ed.), Self-Control and Addiction: Lessons from Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
Gold, N. (unpublished manuscript). Group goals, game theoretic reasoning and spontaneous collective intentions.
Gold, N. and Harbour, D. (2012). Cognitive primitives of collective intentions: linguistic evidence of our mental ontology. Mind & Language 27(2), 109–134.
Gold, N. and Sugden, R. (2007a). Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy 104(3), 109137.
Gold, N. and Sugden, R. (2007b). Theories of team agency. In F. Peter and S. Schmidt (eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press.
Guala, F., Mittone, L., and Ploner, M. (2009). Group membership, team preferences, and expectations. CEEL Working Papers 0906, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
Harsanyi, J., and Selten, R. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hodgson, D. (1967). Consequences of Utilitarianism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hollis, M. (1998). Trust Within Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Hurley, S. (1989). Natural Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Joshi, M. S., Joshi, V., and Lamb, R. (2005). The prisoners’ dilemma and city-centre traffic. Oxford Economic Papers 57(1), 70–89.
Joyce, J. (1999). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Kollock, P. (1998a). Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology 24, 183–214.
Kollock, P. (1998b). Transforming social dilemmas: group identity and cooperation. In P. A. Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution (pp. 186–210). Oxford University Press.
Michod, R. (2005). The group covariance effect and fitness trade-offs during evolutionary transitions in individuality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 103(24), 91139117.
Nash, J. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica 21, 128140.
Okasha, S. (2009). Individuals, groups, fitness and utility: multi-level selection meets social choice theory. Biology and Philosophy 24, 561584.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83, 12811302.
Regan, D. (1980). Utilitarianism and Cooperation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press.
Smerilli, A. (2012). We-thinking and ‘double-crossing’: frames, reasoning and equilibria. Theory and Decision, www.springerlink.com/content/3347v4163114hou2.
Sober, E., and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sugden, R. (1993). Thinking as a team: toward an explanation of nonselfish behavior. Social Philosophy and Policy 10, 6989.
Sugden, R. (2000). Team preferences. Economics and Philosophy 16, 175204.
Sugden, R. (2002). Beyond sympathy and empathy: Adam Smith’s concept of fellow-feeling. Economics and Philosophy 18, 6387.
Sugden, R. (2003). The logic of team reasoning. Philosophical Explorations 6, 165181.
Sugden, R. (2005). Fellow-feeling. In B. Gui and R. Sugden (eds.), Economics and Social Interaction (pp. 52–75). Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, M. (1987). The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tuomela, R. (2009). Collective intentions and game theory. Journal of Philosophy 106, 292300.