Introduction

The antis had asked for a referendum. When they got it, they suffered a crushing defeat, which, in the main, they accepted with reasonable grace. However, as the above quotations suggest, they felt it was not a fair fight. In many respects, this was a justifiable complaint. Certainly, despite the 2 to 1 margin of the result, the referendum settled somewhat less than at first appeared. The Left could not, in the end, accept defeat: for them enduring the EEC meant giving up on socialism, something they would not do. For the antis on the Right, 1975 seemed to be the end of the road. For a dozen years thereafter, most Conservatives remained strongly pro-European, until the tide began to turn in the late 1980s. In this chapter, I explore how the referendum was won and lost, and then consider the subsequent response of the victors and the vanquished.

The period from 1975 to 1983, in addition to being an important turning point for European policy, saw the post-war social democratic model fracture and then disintegrate. On the Right, Thatcherism, after a difficult start, was in the ascendant by 1983 both within the Conservative Party and more widely. Labour moved sharply Left after 1979. The Centre, which dominated the Yes campaign in the referendum, was by 1983 endangered in both main parties. The Left regarded the EEC as an obstacle to its domestic policies. The Right had not yet come to this conclusion.

The Referendum

The antis were not so much defeated as crushed. Not only did Yes secure 67% of the vote, but its triumph was virtually uniform across the UK, in all regions, classes and age groups. The Noes had struggled and failed to counter four interlocking forces, all dedicated to securing a vote to stay in. The first, and perhaps the most important, was the government itself. Then there was the well-financed, but separate, organisation of Britain in Europe (BIE), the umbrella group running the campaign for a Yes vote. Thirdly, the Conservative Party put its weight firmly behind BIE's efforts.