Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to identify lessons arising from the UK’s experience of the three case histories examined in this book. Drawing on the framework set out in Chapter 1, it especially highlights the intelligence/policy interface from the perspective of a former senior intelligence practitioner. Focusing on the UK’s key intelligence assessment bodies, the Joint Intelligence Committee and Defence Intelligence, it argues that only Crimea can really be characterised as a case where there was a failure to warn. Even that is against an environment where the policy community in the UK was focused on better relations with Russia and the UK’s intelligence capacity was directed at counterterrorism in Syria and Afghanistan. Overall, it concludes that surprises are more likely in areas which are a low priority for intelligence collection and assessment – and can never be completely avoided. The provision of effective warnings requires long-term and detailed understanding of a region or issue. Early warning needs to be treated as a specific discipline, with products that clearly stand out as such to the customer. Also, as highlighted by numerous studies, and as in Chapter 1, this chapter stresses the importance of open-source information to build a picture that should not rely on secret sources alone.

Few UK intelligence assessments, or extracts from them, relating to these case histories have been released into the public domain. This chapter therefore draws heavily on reports on the events and the UK intelligence community (IC) and wider government’s reaction to them by the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security and Foreign Affairs Committees, as well as the British government’s response to those reports. It also reflects the author’s personal experience as Chief of the Assessments Staff from 2009–12, preparing papers for the Joint Intelligence Committee, and attending meetings of the National Security Council and its sub-committee during the Libya crisis, NSC(L). Finally, in early 2021, the author was able to interview a number of Defence Intelligence and Cabinet Office analysts who were in the relevant posts at the time. Unfortunately, time and COVID-19 restraints meant that policy staff were not able to be interviewed.