Error and Inference Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction and Background
- 1 Learning from Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge
- 2 The Life of Theory in the New Experimentalism
- 3 Revisiting Critical Rationalism
- 4 Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence
- 5 Induction and Severe Testing
- 6 Theory Testing in Economics and the Error-Statistical Perspective
- 7 New Perspectives on (Some Old) Problems of Frequentist Statistics
- 8 Causal Modeling, Explanation and Severe Testing
- 9 Error and Legal Epistemology
- Index
- References
4 - Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2010
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction and Background
- 1 Learning from Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge
- 2 The Life of Theory in the New Experimentalism
- 3 Revisiting Critical Rationalism
- 4 Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence
- 5 Induction and Severe Testing
- 6 Theory Testing in Economics and the Error-Statistical Perspective
- 7 New Perspectives on (Some Old) Problems of Frequentist Statistics
- 8 Causal Modeling, Explanation and Severe Testing
- 9 Error and Legal Epistemology
- Index
- References
Summary
In this chapter I address what seems to be a sharp difference of opinion between myself and Mayo concerning a fundamental problem in the theory of confirmation. Not surprisingly, I argue that I am right and she is (interestingly) wrong. But first I need to outline the background carefully – because seeing clearly what the problem is (and what it is not) takes us a good way towards its correct solution.
The Duhem Problem and the “UN” Charter
So far as the issue about confirmation that I want to raise here is concerned: in the beginning was the “Duhem problem.” But this problem has often been misrepresented. No sensible argument exists in Duhem (or elsewhere) to the effect that the “whole of our knowledge” is involved in any attempt to test any part of our knowledge. Indeed, I doubt that that claim makes any sense. No sensible argument exists in Duhem (or elsewhere) to the effect that we can never test any particular part of some overall theory or theoretical system, only the “whole” of it. If, for example, a theory falls “naturally” into five axioms, then there is – and can be – no reason why it should be impos-sible that some directly testable consequence follows from, say, four of those axioms – in which case only those four axioms and not the whole of the theory are what is tested.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Error and InferenceRecent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, pp. 125 - 169Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
References
(1992), Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
, and , (2004), “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. (1990), “Fitting Theory to the Facts: Probably Not Such a Bad Idea After All,” in (ed.), Scientific Theories, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Google Scholar
(1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd enlarged ed., 1970), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
, and (1976) “Why Did Copernicus's Programme Supersede Ptolemy's,” Chapter 4 in (ed.), The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge University Press (reprinted 1978).Google Scholar
. (1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000), “The Scope, Limits and Distinctiveness of the Method of “Deduction from the Phenomena”: Some Lessons from Newton's “Demonstrations” in Optics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51: 45–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002), “New Evidence for Old,” in et al. (eds.), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Kluwer, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
(2003), “Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn “versus” Popper and Lakatos,” in (ed.), Thomas Kuhn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
(2006), “Theory Confirmation and History,” in and (eds.), Rationality and Reality, Springer, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
(n.d.) “Miracles, Pessimism and Scientific Realism,” forthcoming.
(1983), “Testing Theoretical Hypotheses,” pp. 269–98 in (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 10, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Google Scholar
, and , (2004), “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (Chapters 8, 9, 10), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2008), “How to Discount Double Counting When It Counts,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59: 857–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1974), “Logical Versus Historical Theories of Confirmation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25: 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989), “Deductive Heuristics,” pp. 15–32 in , , and (eds.), Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, Kluwer, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989), “Fresnel, Poisson, and the White Spot: The Role of Successful Prediction in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories,” pp. 135–57 in , and (eds.), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
(2006), “Responses,” pp. 301–4 in and (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Kluwer Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.Google Scholar
(2002), “New Evidence for Old,” in , , and (eds.), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (vol. 1 of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Cracow, August 1999), Kluwer, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
(2006), “History and Theory-Confirmation,” pp. 31–61 in and (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1992), Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
, and , (2004), “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. (1990), “Fitting Theory to the Facts: Probably Not Such a Bad Idea After All,” in (ed.), Scientific Theories, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Google Scholar
(1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd enlarged ed., 1970), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
, and (1976) “Why Did Copernicus's Programme Supersede Ptolemy's,” Chapter 4 in (ed.), The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge University Press (reprinted 1978).Google Scholar
. (1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000), “The Scope, Limits and Distinctiveness of the Method of “Deduction from the Phenomena”: Some Lessons from Newton's “Demonstrations” in Optics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51: 45–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002), “New Evidence for Old,” in et al. (eds.), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Kluwer, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
(2003), “Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn “versus” Popper and Lakatos,” in (ed.), Thomas Kuhn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
(2006), “Theory Confirmation and History,” in and (eds.), Rationality and Reality, Springer, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
(n.d.) “Miracles, Pessimism and Scientific Realism,” forthcoming.
- 2
- Cited by