Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-pjpqr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-26T09:48:29.458Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Self-deception and survival: mental coping strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2014

Alexander Watson
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Get access

Summary

Adaptation

Human resilience lay at the heart of the robustness displayed by the German and British armies on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918. Military institutions certainly enforced unit cohesion at the front, while societal and battlefield influences may have encouraged men to accept that fighting was necessary. Yet without individuals' innate ability to cope psychologically with the discomfort, danger and, above all, disempowerment of combat, armies would soon have become ineffective organisations full of mentally broken men. The low rates of psychiatric disorders and common displays of astounding endurance witnessed at the front testify, however, to men's success at overcoming unprecedentedly stressful conditions. As the psychiatrist Frederick Dillon observed, ‘it was an impressive fact in the great war [sic] to note the extent to which the ordinary man was capable of adapting himself to active war conditions’.

At the heart of men's adaptation lay the development of appropriate risk-assessment strategies. Soldiers who underestimated or were unable to recognise mortal threat could be overconfident and lose their lives through carelessness. Overestimation of danger could, however, be no less problematic, engendering unnecessary fear and anxiety which might result in panic or mental collapse. Troops new to the front were especially inclined to assess risk inappropriately. On both sides, wartime recruit training was short and often of poor quality. Men consequently arrived in the line with an ignorance of the power of modern weaponry which today seems astounding.

Type
Chapter
Information
Enduring the Great War
Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918
, pp. 85 - 107
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×