The large problem is to understand the morale behind the financial sector's hopes and expectations. It has created so many failures that surely it could decently take a modest role. In the world's greatest democracies, major figures criticise the sector's misuse of its social reasons for existence. Were it not so serious, its wheedling justifications would be pitiful, its own internal critics are disgusted. It is difficult to see how UK and US governments can bail out banks again, politically or economically, but the sector courts self-destruction; evades rules. Various parts play off nation states and attack the feeblest regulations as an affront. Profits must be made against – not for – the world economy, the people, our surroundings and democracies. I showed decent financial firms in Chapter 6, but few are in the City or Wall Street.

The bailouts of so many ill-run, bankrupt firms in 2008 created public confusion. What could be at fault? Who was to blame? Why are such calamities unable to undermine the collective morale inside finance? This chapter offers a different explanation than those usually canvassed. I dispute that the answers are an ideological triumph of economic libertarianism, that is, pro-market ideas. The ‘greed of the titans’ does not explain the tenacity or, even less plausibly, ‘human nature’ either. Is class interest driving these cries for recognition when the ‘titans’ rarely started rich and now could be playboys on their yachts and the ski slopes?