This book has investigated the electoral consequences faced by social democrats after having transformed themselves under Third Way agendas and reformed the welfare state in ways that are contrary to traditional social democratic principles such as decommodification, solidarity and egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990). Esping-Andersen conceptualised the alignment to social democratic parties as a match between their supply of social policy and the demands of the working class and lower white-collar employees. Thus, the decommodification of the wage earner has traditionally been a priority for social democracy, as these policies bound social democracy to its core constituency.

Applying a partisan politics perspective, I argued that by adopting the Third Way agenda, social democrats risk alienating their core constituency, as this implies a moderation of social democracy's stance on social policy. In particular, the welfare state reforms implemented under the Third Way broke with the decommodification principle, since eligibility and entitlements were curtailed, the universality and generosity of social security reduced and benefits cut. Hence, the guiding focus has been the core constituency's potential dealignment from social democracy. Integrating Esping-Andersen's theory into arguments from the New Politics of the Welfare State literature, I established a framework conceptualising the electoral consequences of recommodification for social democracy.

First-past-the-post electoral systems produce a dealignment of social democratic core voters into the non-voter camp, as this electoral system effectively prevents the emergence of serious competitor parties for Third Way social democrats. In contrast, pr systems not only produce dealignments, they are also expected to produce realignments of social democratic core voters, as dangerous challengers to social democracy are present or can easily emerge. Two types of parties have been identified as the most dangerous competitors for Third Way social democracy. First, left-socialist parties can attract social democratic core voters due to their pro-welfare stance in times when social democrats have damaged their welfare reputation. Second, authoritarian right-wing parties have a chance to woo social democratic core voters if the welfare link is broken, because they match voters’ preferences on socio-cultural issues. An important qualification in this respect is that credibility considerations affect whether social democratic core voters will shift to a competitor. The claim is that realignments do not occur automatically once voters become dissatisfied with the social democrats.