Abrams, Burton A., and Butkiewicz, James L.. 2012. The Political Business Cycle: New Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44: 385–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Achen, Christopher H. 2012. When Is Myopic Retrospection Rational? Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Achen, Christopher H., and Bartels, Larry M.. 2004. Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Ahamed, Liaquat. 2009. Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World. New York: Penguin Books.Google Scholar

Akerlof, George, and Shiller, Robert. 2009. Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Aldrich, John H., and Rohde, David W.. 2000. The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government. In Bond, Jon R. and Fleisher, Richard (eds.), Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, pp. 31–72. Washington, DC: CQ Press.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto. 1987. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 651–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto. 1988a. Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters. American Economic Review 78: 796–805.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto. 1988b. The End of Large Public Debts. In Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa, Luigi (eds.), High Public Debt: The Italian Experience, pp. 34–89. New York:Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto. 1995. Elections, Party Structure and the Economy. In Banks, Jeff and Hanuschek, Eric (eds.), Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, pp. 145–70. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, Cohen, Gerald D., and Roubini, Nouriel. 1992a. Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies. In Cukierman, Alex, Hercowitz, Zvi, and Leiderman, Leonardo (eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles, pp. 227–62. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, Cohen, Gerald D., and Roubini, Nouriel. 1992b. Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies. Economics and Politics 4: 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, and Cukierman, Alex. 1990. The Politics of Ambiguity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 829–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, and Drazen, Allen. 1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?American Economic Review 81: 1170–88.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, Londregan, John, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1993. A Model of the Political Economy of the United States. American Political Science Review 87: 12–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1994. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, and Sachs, Jeffrey. 1988. Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948–1984. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 20: 63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, and Summers, Lawrence H.. 1993. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25: 151–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alesina, Alberto, and Tabellini, Guido. 1990. A Positive Theory of Budget Deficits and Government Debt. Review of Economic Studies 57: 403–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alt, James E. 1979. The Politics of Economic Decline: Economic Management and Political Behaviour in Britain since 1964. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Alt, James E. 1985. Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity. American Political Science Review 79: 1016–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alt, James E. 1991. Leaning into the Wind or Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy in the 1980s. In Alesina, Alberto and Carliner, Geoffrey (eds.), Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pp. 41–82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Alt, James E., and Chrystal, K. Alex. 1983. Political Economics. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Alt, James E., and Lowry, Robert. 1994. Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States. American Political Science Review 88: 759–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alt, James E., and Stewart, Charles. 1990. Parties and the Deficit: Some Historical Evidence. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Government, Harvard University.

Alt, James E., and Woolley, John T.. 1982. Reaction Functions, Optimization, and Politics: Modelling the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy. American Journal of Political Science 26: 709–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Aluise, Joseph. 1991. The Microeconomic Foundations of the Natural Rate of Unemployment and the Leverage of Political Parties. Unpublished manuscript, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Alvarez, R. Michael, Garrett, Geoffrey, and Lange, Peter. 1991. Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance. American Political Science Review 85: 539–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Andrabi, Tahir. 1993. Seignorage, Taxation, and Weak Government. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, Pomona College.

Ariely, Dan. 2008. Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.Google Scholar

Arndt, H. W. 1978. The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth: A Study in Contemporary Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar

Arrow, Kenneth J., and Hahn, F. H.. 1971. General Competitive Analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day.Google Scholar

Asher, Martin A., DeFina, Robert H., and Thanawala, Kishor. 1993. The Misery Index: Only Part of the Story. Challenge 36(2): 58–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Auerbach, Alan J. 2008. Federal Budget Rules: The U.S. Experience. Swedish Economic Policy Review 15(1): 57–82.Google Scholar

Auerbach, Alan J., Gale, William G., and Harris, Benjamin H.. 2010. Activist Fiscal Policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(4, Fall): 141–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bagehot, Walter. 1873/2012. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Seattle: Amazon.com.Google Scholar

Bailey, Stephen K. 1950. Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar

Balke, Nathan S. 1991. Partisanship Theory, Macroeconomic Outcomes, and Endogenous Elections. Southern Economic Journal 57: 920–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Baron, David P. 1991. Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control. American Journal of Political Science 35: 57–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Barro, Robert J. 1973. The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. Public Choice 14: 19–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Barro, Robert J. 1979. On the Determination of the Public Debt. Journal of Political Economy 87: 940–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Barro, Robert J. 1986. U.S. Deficits since World War I. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88: 195–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Barro, Robert J., and Gordon, David. 1983. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Bartlett, Bruce. 2009. The New American Economy: The Failure of Reaganomics and a New Way Forward. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar

Baumgartner, Frank, and Jones, Bryan D.. 2009. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Beck, Nathaniel. 1982. Parties, Administrations, and American Macroeconomic Outcomes. American Political Science Review 76: 83–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Beck, Thorsten, Clarke, George, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip, and Walsh, Patrick. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Economic Review. 15: 165–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Berdejό, Carlos and Chen, Daniel. 2010. Priming Ideology: Electoral Cycles among Unelected Judges. Working paper, Duke University Law School.

Bernhard, William, Broz, J. Lawrence, and Clark, William Roberts. 2003. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Bernholz, Peter. 2003. Monetary Regimes and Inflation: History, Economics and Political Relationships. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.Google Scholar

Besley, Timothy. 2006. Principled Agents: The Political Economy of Good Government. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Bianco, William T. 1994. A Proper Responsibility: Representatives, Constituents, and Decisions about Trust. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Blais, Andre, Blake, Donald, and Dion, Stcphane. 1993. Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 37: 40–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Blanchard, Olivier. 2009. The State of Macro. Annual Review of Economics 1:209–28. Accessible online at econ.annualreviews.org. NBER Working Paper 14259.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Blanchard, Olivier, and Fischer, Stanley. 1989. Lectures on Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Blanchard, Olivier, and Simon, John. 2001. The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 135–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Blinder, Alan S. 1987. Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough Minded Economics for a Just Society. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar

Blinder, Alan S. 2006. The Case against the Case against Fiscal Policy. Chapter 2 in Kopke, Richard W., Tootell, Geoffrey M. B., and Triest, Robert K. (eds.), The Macroeconomics of Fiscal Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Blinder, Alan S. 2013. After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead. New York: The Penguin Press.Google Scholar

Blinder, Alan S., and Holtz-Eakin, Douglas. 1984. Public Opinion and the Balanced Budget. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 74: 144–49.Google Scholar

Blinder, Alan S., and Solow, Robert M.. 1974. Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy. In Blinder, Alan S. et al. (eds.), The Economics of Public Finance, pp. 3–115. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Bordo, Michael D. 1990. The Lender of Last Resort: Alternative Views and Historical Experience. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review January/February.Google Scholar

Bordo, Michael D., and Wheelock, David C.. 2011. The Promise and Performance of the Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort 1914–1933. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 16763. (Originally prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Conference Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the Jekyll Island Conference, Jekyll Island, GA, November 5–6, 2010.)

Brady, David, and Morgan, Mark A.. 1987. Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriations Process: The effects of the 1885 and 1919–20 Reforms on Money Decisions. In McCubbins, Mathew and Sullivan, Terry (eds.), Congress: Structure and Policy, pp. 207–34. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Bratton, Kathleen A. 1994. Retrospective Voting and Future Expectations: The Case of the Budget Deficit in the 1988 Election. American Politics Quarterly 22: 277–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Brender, Adi, and Drazen, Allan. 2005. Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1271–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Brown, E. Cary. 1956. Fiscal Policy in the “Thirties”: A Reappraisal. American Economic Review 46: 857–79.Google Scholar

Brown, E. Cary. 1990. Episodes in the Public Debt History of the United States. In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Draghi, Mario (eds.), Public Debt Management: Theory and History, pp. 229–62. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Broz, J. Lawrence. 1993. Wresting the Scepter from London: The International Political Economy of the Founding of the Federal Reserve. Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 1997. The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar

Bryant, Ralph C. 1980. Money and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Nations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Buchanan, James M. 1969. Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.Google Scholar

Buchanan, James M., Rowley, Charles K., and Tollison, Robert D. (eds.). 1986. Deficits. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Buchanan, James M., and Wagner, Richard E.. 1977. Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar

Budge, Ian, and Hofferbert, Richard I.. 1990. Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures. American Political Science Review 84: 111–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cagan, Phillip. 1987. Hyperinflation. In Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray, and Newman, Peter (eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2, pp. 704–6. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar

Campbell, James E. 2011. The Economic Records of the Presidents: Party Differences and Inherited Economic Conditions. Forum 9: 1–29.Google Scholar

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Park, Jee-Kwang. 2012. Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries. American Political Science Review 106: 103–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Carpenter, Daniel. 2010. Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration. Perspectives on Politics 8(3): 825–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cassidy, John. 2009. How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., Havrilesky, Thomas M., and MacGregor, Rob Roy. 1993. Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence through the Power of Appointment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 185–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., and Keech, William R.. 1985a. A New View of Accountability for Economic Performance. American Political Science Review 79: 10–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., and Keech, William R.. 1985b. The Political Viability of Rule-based Monetary Policy. Public Choice 46: 125–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., and Keech, William R.. 1986a. Party Differences in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 76: 71–4.Google Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., and Keech, William R.. 1986b. Policy Motivations and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition. American Political Science Review 80: 881–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., and Keech, William R.. 1988a. The Unemployment Consequences of Partisan Monetary Policy. Southern Economic Journal 55: 107–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chappell, Henry W., and Keech, William R.. 1988b. Choice and Circumstance: The Consequences of Partisan Macroeconomic Policies. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Chappell, Henry W., McGregor, Rob Roy, and Vermilyea, Todd A.. 2005. Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Cheibub, José Antonio, Gandhi, Jennifer, and Vreeland, James Raymond. 2010. Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited. Public Choice 143: 67–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Clarida, Richard, Galí, Jordi, and Gertler, Mark. 2000. Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 147–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Sona, and Poast, Paul. 2012. Monetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leaders. International Studies Quarterly (first published online in November).

Clark, William Roberts, and Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2013. Independent but not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed. Economics and Politics 25: 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cole, Harold L., and Ohanian, Lee E.. 2004. Great Depression: A Neoclassical Analysis. Journal of Political Economy 112: 779–816.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Collender, Stanley E. 1992. A Guide to the Federal Budget, Fiscal 1993. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.Google Scholar

Comiskey, Michael, and Marsh, Lawrence C.. 2012. Presidents, Parties, and the Business Cycle, 1949–2009. Presidential Studies Quarterly 42: 59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Conley, Patricia Heidotting. 2001. Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Cooter, Robert D., and Siegel, Neil. 2010. Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8. Stanford Law Review 63: 115–85.Google Scholar

Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Cukierman, Alex, and Meltzer, Allan. 1986. A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Costs of Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution. Economic Inquiry 24: 367–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cukierman, Alex, and Meltzer, Allan. 1989. A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework. American Economic Review 79: 69–95.Google Scholar

Cukierman, Alex, and Tommasi, Mariano. 1998. When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?American Economic Review 88: 180–97.Google Scholar

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Dahl, Robert A. 2002. How Democratic Is the American Constitution?New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Dam, Kenneth. 1982. The Rules of the Game. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

DeVroey, Michel, and Duarte, Pedro Garcia. 2012. In Search of Lost Time: The Neoclassical Synthesis. Sao Paolo, Brazil: USP Department of Economics. Working Paper #2012-07.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.Google Scholar

Drazen, Allan. 2000. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Dryzek, John S. 1990. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Duch, Raymond M., and Stevenson, Randolph T.. 2008. The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Dynan, Karen E., Elmendorf, Douglas W., and Sichel, Daniel E.. 2006. Can Financial Innovation Help to Explain the Reduced Volatility of Economic Activity?Journal of Monetary Economics 53: 123–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Economic Report of the President. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Various years.

Edwards, George C. 1990. Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar

Eichengreen, Barry (ed.). 1985. The Gold Standard in Theory and History. New York: Methuen.

Eichengreen, Barry. 1992a. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Eichengreen, Barry. 1992b. Designing a Central Bank for Europe: A Cautionary Tale from the Early Years of the Federal Reserve System. In Canzoneri, Matthew B., Grilli, Vittorio, and Masson, Paul R. (eds.), Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S., pp. 13–48. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Eisner, Robert. 1986. How Real Is the Federal Deficit?New York: Free Press.Google Scholar

Elmendorf, Douglas W., and Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1999. Government Debt. In Taylor, John B. and Woodford, Michael (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, pp. 1615–69. Amsterdam: Elsevier.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Erikson, Robert S. 1989. Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote. American Political Science Review 83: 567–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Erikson, Robert S. 1990. Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence. American Journal of Political Science 34: 373–399.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Erikson, Robert S., MacKuen, Michael B., and Stimson, James A.. 2000. Bankers or Peasants Revisited: Economic Expectations and Presidential Approval. Electoral Studies 19: 295–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fair, Ray C. 1978. The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President. Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 159–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fair, Ray C. 1984. Specification, Estimation, and Analysis of Macroeconomic Models. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Fair, Ray C. 1988. The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1984 Update. Political Behavior 10: 168–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fair, Ray C. 1990. The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1988 Update. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, Yale University.

Fair, Ray C. 2009. Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations. American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 55–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Farmer, Roger E. A. 2008. Animal Spirits. In Blume, L. and Durlauf, S. (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1, pp. 157–63. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar

Farmer, Roger E. A. 2009. Review. Economic Record. 85: 357–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Farmer, Roger E. A. 2010a. Expectations, Employment and Prices. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Farmer, Roger E. A. 2010b. How the Economy Works and How to Fix It When It Doesn’t: Confidence, Crashes and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Fearon, James D. 1999. Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance. In Przeworski, Adam, Stokes, Susan C., and Manin, Bernard (eds.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, pp. 55–97. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Feldstein, Martin. 2010. Preventing a National Debt Explosion. Cambridge, MA: NBER Working Paper 16451.

Fenno, Richard F. 1966. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar

Ferejohn, John. 1986. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control. Public Choice 50: 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2011. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. New York: Public Affairs. Available at .Google Scholar

Fiorina, Morris. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Fiorina, Morris. 1992. Divided Government. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar

Fiorina, Morris. 2009. Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.Google Scholar

Fischer, Stanley. 1986. Indexing, Inflation, and Economic Policy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Fischer, Stanley, and Huizinga, John. 1982. Inflation, Unemployment, and Public Opinion Polls. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 14: 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fischer, Stanley, Sahay, Ratna, and Végh, Carlos A.. 2002. Modern Hyper- and High Inflations. Journal of Economic Literature 40: 837–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fishback, Price V. 2010. US Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the 1930s. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26: 385–413.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fisher, Louis. 1975. Presidential Spending Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Fisher, Louis. 1985. Ten Years of the Budget Act: Still Searching for Controls. Public Budgeting and Finance 5: 3–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Forgette, Richard. 1993. Budget Balance and Government Party Control: Does Divided Government Matter? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Fox, Justin. 2009. The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.Google Scholar

French, Kenneth R., et al. 2010. The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Frey, Bruno S. 1983. Democratic Economic Policy: A Theoretical Introduction. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar

Frey, Bruno S., and Schneider, Friedrich. 1978. An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the U.S. Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 174–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Friedman, Milton. 1953a. A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability. In Friedman, Milton (ed.), Essays in Positive Economics, pp. 133–56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reprinted from American Economic Review 38: 245–64 (1948).Google Scholar

Friedman, Milton. 1953b. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Friedman, Milton. 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University Press.Google Scholar

Friedman, Milton. 1962. Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority? In Yeager, Leland B. (ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution, pp. 219–43. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Friedman, Milton. 1968. The Role of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review 58: 1–17.Google Scholar

Friedman, Milton. 1977. Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment. Journal of Political Economy 85: 451–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna Jacobson. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Froyen, Richard T. 2009. Macroeconomics: Theories and Policies, 9th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.Google Scholar

Gali, Jordi, and Gambetti, Luca. 2009. On the Sources of the Great Moderation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1: 26–57.Google Scholar

Garrett, Geoffrey, and Lange, Peter. 1991. Political Responses to Interdependence: What’s “Left” for the Left?International Organization 45: 539–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gelinas, Nicole. 2009. After the Fall: Saving Capitalism from Wall Street – and Washington. New York: Encounter Books.Google Scholar

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Lupia, Arthur. 1995. Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections. Political Behavior, 17: 287–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gilmour, John B. 1990. Reconcilable Differences? Congress, the Budget Process and the Deficit. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Golden, David G., and Poterba, James M.. 1980. The Price of Popularity: The Political Business Cycle Reexamined. American Journal of Political Science 24: 696–714.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Goodfriend, Marvin. 2002. Monetary Policy in the New Neoclassical Synthesis: A Primer. International Finance 5: 165–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Goodfriend, Marvin. 2007. How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Fall, 47–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Goodhart, Charles A. E. 2011. The Squam Lake Report: Commentary. Journal of Economic Literature 49: 114–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gorton, Gary. 2010. Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Grabell, Michael. 2012. Money Well Spent? The Truth behind the Trillion-Dollar Stimulus, the Biggest Economic Recovery Plan in History. New York: Public Affairs.Google Scholar

Grafstein, Robert. 1990. Missing the Archimedean Point: Liberalism’s Institutional Presuppositions. American Political Science Review 84: 177–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gramlich, Edward M. 1983. Models of Inflation Expectations Formation: A Comparison of Household and Economist Forecasts. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 15: 155–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gramlich, Edward M. 1991. U.S. Budget Deficits: Views, Burdens, and New Developments. In Rock, James M. (ed.), Debt and the Twin Deficits Debate, pp. 173–87. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing.Google Scholar

Gramlich, Edward M. 2007. Subprime Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.Google Scholar

Granato, Jim, and Wong, M. C. Sunny. 2005. Using Monetary Policy to Coordinate Price Information: Implications for Economic Stability and Development. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 6(2): 49–60.Google Scholar

Granato, Jim, and Wong, M. C. Sunny. 2006. The Role of Policymakers in Business Cycle Fluctuations. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Greene, Jay P. 1993. Forewarned Before Forecast: Presidential Election Forecasting Models and the 1992 Election. PS: Political Science and Politics 26: 17–21.Google Scholar

Greider, William. 1987. Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar

Grier, Kevin D. 1989. On the Existence of a Political Monetary Cycle. American Journal of Political Science 33: 376–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Grier, Kevin. 1993. On the Existence and (Constrained) Optimality of the Political Business Cycle. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, George Mason University.

Grilli, Vittorio, Masciandaro, Donato, and Tabellini, Guido. 1991. Institutions and Policies. Economic Policy 13: 341–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Grunwald, Michael. The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era. New York: Simon & Shuster.

Hahm, Sung Deuk, Kamlet, Mark S., and Mowery, David C.. 1993. The Political Economy of Deficit Spending in Parliamentary Democracies: The Role of Fiscal Institutions. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Hall, Robert E. 2010. Why Does the Economy Fall to Pieces after a Financial Crisis?Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(4): 3–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hallerberg, Mark, Strauch, Rolf Rainer, and von Hagen, Jürgen. 2009. Fiscal Governance in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New York: The New American Library of World Literature.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hanke, Steve H., and Kwok, Alex K. F.. 2009. On the Measurement of Zimbabwe’s Hyperinflation. Cato Journal 29: 353–64.Google Scholar

Hargrove, Erwin C., and Morley, Samuel A. (eds.). 1984. The President and the Council of Economic Advisors. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Harrington, Joseph E. 1993. Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections. American Economic Review 83: 27–43.Google Scholar

Havrilesky, Thomas. 1987. A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 19: 308–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Havrilesky, Thomas. 1993. The Pressures on American Monetary Policy. Boston: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Havrilesky, Thomas, Chapped, Henry, Gildea, John, and McGregor, Rob. 1993. Congress Threatens the Fed. Challenge 36(2): 50–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Chapter 6. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Haynes, Stephen E., and Stone, Joe A.. 1989a. Political Models of the Business Cycle Should Be Revived. Economic Inquiry 28: 442–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Haynes, Stephen E., and Stone, Joe A.. 1989b. Political Parties and the Variable Duration of Business Cycles. Southern Economic Journal 60: 869–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Heller, Walter. 1966. New Dimensions of Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The institutional environment for economic growth. Economics and Politics 12(1): 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Henisz, Witold J. 2002. The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(2): 355–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Henisz, Witold J. 2004. Political Institutions and Policy Volatility. Economics and Politics, 16: 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Henisz, Witold J. 2012. Polcon_2011 Codebook (with data to 2007). (accessed December 3, 2012).

Henisz, Witold J., and Mansfield, Edward D.. 2006. Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness. International Studies Quarterly, Wiley Online Library 50: 189–212.Google Scholar

Henisz, Witold J., and Zelner, Bennet A.. 2001. The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10: 123–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1982. President Reagan’s Mandate from the 1980 Elections: A Shift to the Right?American Politics Quarterly 10: 387–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1987. The American Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1992. Partisan Theory after Fifteen Years. European Journal of Political Economy 8: 361–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1994. The Partisan Model of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory and Evidence for the United States. Economics and Politics 6: 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 2006. Voting and the Macroeconomy. In Weingast, Barry R. and Wittman, Donald A. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, pp. 565–86. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A. 2012a. “Bread and Peace” and “Bread and Incumbency” Models for the 2012 US Presidential and House Elections. Powerpoint slides prepared for the World Congress of the Public Choice Society, Miami.

Hibbs, Douglas A. 2012b. Obama’s Reelection Prospects under “Bread and Peace” Voting in the 2012 US Presidential Election. PS: Political Science and Politics 46: 635–9.Google Scholar

Hibbs, Douglas A., and Dennis, Christopher. 1988. Income Distribution in the United States. American Political Science Review 87: 467–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hirschman, Albert O. 1991. The Rhetoric of Reaction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Hoover, Kevin D. 1988. The New Classical Macroeconomics: A Skeptical Inquiry. London: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar

Hoover, Kevin D. 2001. Causality in Macroeconomics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hoover, Kevin D. 2012. Applied Intermediate Macroeconomics. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Hoover, Kevin D., and Sheffrin, Michael. 1992. Causation, Spending and Taxes: Sand in the Sandbox or Tax Collector for the Welfare State. American Economic Review 82: 225–48.Google Scholar

Hoover, Kevin D., and Siegler, Mark V.. 2000. Taxing and Spending in the Long View: The Causal Structure of US Fiscal Policy, 1791–1913. Oxford Economic Papers 52: 745–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hoshi, Takeo. 2011. Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crises. Journal of Economic Literature 49: 120–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Huber, John D., and Powell, G. Bingham 1992. Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Views of Liberal Democracy. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Igan, Deniz, Mishra, Prachi, and Tressel, Thierry. 2009. A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis. IMF Working Paper WP/09/287.

Ilzetzki, Ethan, Mendoza, Enrique G., and Végh, Carlos A.. 2010. How Big or Small Are Fiscal Multipliers? NBER Working Paper 16479.

Ingrassia, Paul. 2010. Crash Course: The American Automobile Industry’s Road from Glory to Disaster. New York: Random House.Google Scholar

Ippolito, Dennis S. 2012. Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David. 2006. New Macroeconomics and Political Science. Annual Reviews of Political Science 9: 425–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. Does the Economy Matter in Midterm Elections?American Journal of Political Science 34: 400–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 1992. Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Johnson, James. 1993. Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational Choice. American Political Science Review 87: 74–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Johnson, Simon, and Kwak, James. 2010. 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown. New York: Pantheon Books.Google Scholar

Johnson, Simon, and Kwak, James. 2012. White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You. New York: Pantheon Books.Google Scholar

Kahn, R. F. 1931. The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment. Economic Journal 41: 173–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar

Kamlet, Mark S., Mowery, David C., and Su, Tsai-Tsu. 1988. Upsetting National Priorities: The Reagan Administration’s Budgetary Strategy. American Political Science Review 82: 1293–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kane, Edward J. 1990. Bureaucratic Self-interest as an Obstacle to Monetary Reform. In Mayer, Thomas (ed.), The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, pp. 283–98. New York:Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Keech, William R. 1992. Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking. Governance 5: 259–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Keech, William R. 1999. Policy Innovations and Policy Reversals. In Polsby, Nelson W. and Wolfinger, Raymond E. (eds.), On Parties: Essays Honoring Austin Ranney, pp. 203–18. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press.Google Scholar

Keech, William R. 2009. A Scientifically Superior Conception of Democracy. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago.

Keech, William R., and Lynch, G. Patrick. 1992. Business Cycles and Presidential Elections in the United States: Another Look at Key and Downs on Retrospective Voting. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Keech, William R., and Morris, Irwin L.. 1997. Appointments, Presidential Power, and the Federal Reserve. Journal of Macroeconomics 19: 253–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Keech, William R., and Pak, Kyoungsan. 1989. Electoral Cycles and Budgetary Growth in Veterans’ Benefit Programs. American Journal of Political Science 33: 901–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Keech, William R., and Simon, Carl P.. 1985. Electoral and Welfare Consequences of Political Manipulation of the Economy. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 6: 177–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kehoe, Timothy J., and Prescott, Edward C. (eds.). 2007. Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century. Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

Kelley, Stanley 1983. Interpreting Elections. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kettl, Donald F. 1986. Leadership at the Fed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Key, V. O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936–1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: Macmillan. Reissued in 1964 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.Google Scholar

Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar

Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1981. Policy-oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues. American Political Science Review 75: 448–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. Macroeconomics and Micropolitics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar

Klamer, Arjo. 1984. Conversations with Economists: New Classical Economists and Opponents Speak Out on the Current Controversy in Macroeconomics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.Google Scholar

Klein, Martin, and Neumann, Manfred J. M.. 1990. Seignorage: What Is It and Who Gets It. Weltwirtschafiiches Archiv 126: 205–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kotlikoff, Laurence J. 1992. Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend. New York: Free Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964. American Political Science Review 65: 131–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting. American Political Science Review 77: 92–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kreps, David M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Krugman, Paul. 1992. The Age of Diminished Expectations: U.S. Economic Policy in the 1990s. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Krugman, Paul. 2009. How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?New York Times Magazine. September 2.Google Scholar

Kuklinski, James H., and West, Darrell M.. 1981. Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in United States House and Senate Elections. American Political Science Review 75: 436–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kydland, Finn, and Prescott, Edward C.. 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 83: 473–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kydland, Finn, and Prescott, Edward C.. 1982. Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica 50: 1345–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Leeper, Erik M. 2010. Monetary Science, Fiscal Alchemy. Presented at Jackson Hole, WY, conference sponsored by the Kansas City Fed.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Nadeau, Richard. 2011. Economic Voting Theory: Testing New Dimensions. Electoral Studies 30: 288–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar

Loewenstein, Roger. 2010. The End of Wall Street. New York: Penguin Press.Google Scholar

Lohmann, Susanne. 1992. Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility vs. Flexibility. American Economic Review 82: 273–86.Google Scholar

Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. New York: Norton.Google Scholar

Lucas, Robert E. 1981. Studies in Business Cycle Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Lucas, Robert E. 2009. In Defence of the Dismal Science. The Economist, August 6, p. 67.Google Scholar

MacKuen, Michael B., Erikson, Robert S., and Stimson, James A.. 1992. Peasants or Bankers: The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy. American Political Science Review 86: 597–611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Majone, Giandomenico. 1989. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1990. A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics. Journal of Economic Literature 28: 1645–60.Google Scholar

Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Romer, David (eds.). 1991. New Keynesian Economics, 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Weinzierl, Matthew. 2011. An Exploration of Optimal Stabilization Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Spring: 209–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mann, Thomas E., and Ornstein, Norman J.. 2012. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar

Mashaw, Jerry L. 1989. The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law. Chicago-Kent Law Review 65: 123–61.Google Scholar

May, Kenneth O. 1952. A Set of Independent, Necessary, and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision. Econometrica 20: 680–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946–1990. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

McCallum, Bennett. 1978. The Political Business Cycle: An Empirical Test. Southern Economic Journal 45: 504–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

McCallum, Bennett T. 1988. Robustness Properties of a Rule for Monetary Policy. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 29: 173–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

McCarty, Nolan, Poole, Keith, and Rosenthal, Howard. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

McCubbins, Mathew D. 1991. Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Government and Fiscal Stalemate. In Alesina, Alberto and Carliner, Geoffrey (eds.), Economics and Politics in the 1980s, pp. 83–122. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

McConnell, Perez-Quiros. 2000. Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has Changed since the Early 1980s?AER: 90: 1464–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

McKinley, Vern. 2011. Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute.Google Scholar

McLean, Bethany, and Nocera, Joe. 2010. All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. New York: The Penguin Group.Google Scholar

Meltzer, Allan H. 1986. Financial Failures and Financial Policies. In Kaufman, G. G. and Kormendi, R. C. (eds.), Deregulating Financial Service: Public Policy in Flux, pp. 79–96 Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.Google Scholar

Meltzer, Allan H. 1987. Limits of Short-Run Stabilization Policy: Presidential Address to the Western Economic Association. Economic Inquiry 25: 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Meltzer, Allan H. 1988. Keynes’s Monetary Theory: A Different Interpretation. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Meltzer, Allan H. 2003. A History of the Federal Reserve. Volume 1: 1913–1951. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Meltzer, Allan H. 2009. A History of the Federal Reserve. Volume 2: 1951–1986. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Merton, Robert K. 1936. The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. American Sociological Review 1: 894–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mettler, Suzanne. 2011. The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mian, Atif, Sufi, Amir, and Trebbi, Francesco. 2010a. The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion. Cambridge, MA: NBER Working paper 16107.

Mian, Atif, Sufi, Amir, and Trebbi, Francesco. 2010b. The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis. American Economic Review 100: 1967–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Miller, Arthur H., and Wattenberg, Martin P.. 1985. Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1980. American Political Science Review 79: 359–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Miller, Marcus, Weller, Paul, and Zhang, Lei. 2002. Moral Hazard and the US Stock Market: Analyzing the “Greenspan Put.”Economic Journal 112: 171–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Modigliani, Andre, and Modigliani, Franco. 1987. The Growth of the Federal Deficit and the Role of Public Attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly 51: 459–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Morgenson, Gretchen, and Rosner, Joshua. 2011. Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon. New York: Times Books.Google Scholar

Morris, Irwin L. 1994. Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American Monetary Policy. Doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Morris, Irwin L. 2000. Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American Monetary Policy-Making. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mosley, Paul. 1984. The Making of Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence from Britain and the United States since 1945. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar

Mueller, Dennis. 2003. Public Choice III. New York:Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. 2010. The Moment of Truth. Google Scholar

Ng, Ging Cee, and Tambalotti, Andrea. 2012. The Great Moderation, Forecast Uncertainty, and the Great Recession. (accessed June 12, 2012).

Niskanen, William A. 2008. Reflections of a Political Economist. Washington, DC: The Cato Institute.Google Scholar

Nordhaus, William. 1975. The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42: 169–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Nordhaus, William. 1989. Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 1–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Okun, Arthur. 1973. Comment on Stigler’s Paper. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 63: 172–80.Google Scholar

Okun, Arthur. 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Olson, Mancur 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Olson, Mancur 1984. Beyond Keynesianism and Monetarism. Economic Inquiry 22: 297–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Olson, Mancur 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review 87: 567–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

“The Other-Worldly Philosophers.” 2009. The Economist, July 18, p. 65.

Paldam, Martin. 1991. How Robust Is the Vote Function: A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four Decades. In Norpoth, Helmut, Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Lafay, Jean Dominique (eds.), Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support, pp. 9–31. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Paul, Ron. 2009. End the Fed. New York: Grand Central Publishing.Google Scholar

Peltzman, Sam. 1991. Voters as Fiscal Conservatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 327–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Persson, Torsten, and Svensson, Lars E. O.. 1989. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 325–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. 1990. Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. Chur, Switzerland, and New York: Harwood Academic Publishers.Google Scholar

Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Peterson, Paul. 1985. The New Politics of Deficits. In Chubb, John and Peterson, Paul (eds.), New Directions in American Politics, pp. 365–97. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Peterson, Peter. 1993. Facing Up: How to Rescue the Economy from Crushing Debt and Restore the American Dream. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar

Petrocik, John R. 1996. Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections with a 1980 Case Study. American Journal of Political Science 40: 825–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Phelps, Edmund S. 1990. Seven Schools of Macroeconomic Thought. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Phillips, A. W. 1958. The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957. Economica (NS) 25: 283–99.Google Scholar

Plott, Charles R. 1991. Will Economics Become an Experimental Science?Southern Economic Journal 57: 901–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Portney, Paul R. 1976. Congressional Delays in U.S. Fiscal Policymaking: Simulating the Effects. Journal of Public Economics 5: 237–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Poterba, James M. 1994. State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics. Journal of Political Economy 102: 799–821.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Prescott, Edward C. 2006. Nobel Lecture: The Transformation of Macroeconomic Policy and Research. Journal of Political Economy 114: 203–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Primo, David M. 2007. Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Quattrone, George, and Tversky, Amos. 1988. Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. American Political Science Review 82: 719–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Quinn, Dennis P., and Shapiro, Robert Y.. 1991. Economic Growth Strategies: The Effects of Ideological Partisanship on Interest Rates and Business Taxation. American Journal of Political Science 35: 656–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rajan, Raghuram. 2010. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Reinhart, Carmen M., and Reinhart, Vincent. 2010. After the Fall. Presented at Jackson Hole, WY, conference sponsored by the Kansas City Fed.

Reinhart, Carmen M., and Rogoff, Kenneth S.. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Reischauer, Robert D. 1990. Taxes and Spending under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. National Tax Journal 44: 223–32.Google Scholar

Remmer, Karen E. 1993. The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 1980–1991. American Political Science Review 87: 393–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Richards, Daniel J. 1986. Unanticipated Money and the Political Business Cycle. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 18: 447–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.Google Scholar

Rivers, Douglas. 1988. Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice. American Journal of Political Science 32: 737–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rock, James M. (ed.). 1991. Debt and the Twin Deficits Debate. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co.

Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1169–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review 80: 21–36.Google Scholar

Rogoff, Kenneth, and Sibert, Anne. 1988. Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of Economic Studies 55: 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Romer, Christina D., and Romer, David H.. 2007. Do Tax Cuts Starve the Beast? The Effect of Tax Changes on Government Spending. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 13548.

Roubini, Nouriel, and Mihm, Stephen. 2010. Crisis Economics: A Crash Course on the Future of Finance. New York: The Penguin Press.Google Scholar

Roubini, Nouriel, and Sachs, Jeffrey D.. 1989a. Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies. European Economic Review 33: 903–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Roubini, Nouriel, and Sachs, Jeffrey D.. 1989b. Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries. Economic Policy 4: 100–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Larraín, Felipe 1993. Macroeconomics in the Global Economy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar

Salsman, Richard Michael. 2012. The Political Economy of Public Credit. PhD dissertation, Duke University.

Samuelson, Paul A., and Solow, Robert M.. 1960. Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 50: 177–94.Google Scholar

Sargent, Thomas. 1986. Rational Expectations and Inflation. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar

Sargent, Thomas, and Wallace, Neil. 1976. Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 2: 169–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Savage, James D. 1988. Balanced Budgets and American Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar

Schick, Allen. 1993. Governments versus Budget Deficits. In Weaver, R. Kent and Rockman, Bert A. (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, pp. 187–236. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Schlozman, Kay L., and Verba, Sidney. 1979. Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class, and Political Response. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Schneider, Friedrich, and Frey, Bruno S.. 1988. Politico-Economic Models of Macroeconomic Policy: A Review of the Empirical Evidence. In Willett, Thomas D. (ed.), Political Business Cycles: The Political Economy of Money, Inflation, and Unemployment, pp. 239–75. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Google Scholar

Scitovsky, Tibor. 1992. The Joyless Economy, rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Seater, John J. 1993. Ricardian Equivalence. Journal of Economic Literature. 31: 142–90.Google Scholar

Sen, Amartya K. 1993. The Economics of Life and Death. Scientific American 268: 40–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1988. Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off. Political Science Quarterly 103: 461–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1991. Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment. In Bourdieu, Pierre and Coleman, James S. (eds.), Social Theory for a Changing Society, pp. 245–65. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1992. Congress Is a “They,” not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron. International Review of Law and Economics 12: 239–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1981. Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization. American Journal of Political Science 25: 96–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1984. Political Solutions to Market Problems. American Political Science Review 78: 417–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Simon, Herbert. 1978. Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 68: 1–16.Google Scholar

Simon, Herbert. 1983. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar

Sleeman, A. G. 2011. Retrospectives: The Phillips Curve: A Rushed Job?Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(1): 223–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Smith, Adam. 1976/1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Sniderman, Paul M., Brody, Richard A., and Tetlock, Philip E.. 1991. Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Soneji, Samir, and King, Gary. 2012. Statistical Security for Social Security. Demography 49: 1037–60.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Sowell, Thomas. 2010. The Housing Boom and Bust (rev. ed.). New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar

Sowell, Thomas. 2012. “Trickle Down” Theory and “Tax Cuts for the Rich.” Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press Publication No. 635.Google Scholar

Stein, Herbert. 1969. The Fiscal Revolution in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Stein, Herbert. 1978. The Decline of the Budget-Balancing Doctrine or How the Good Guys Finally Lost. In Buchanan, James M. and Wagner, Richard E. (eds.), Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy, pp. 35–58. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Stein, Herbert. 1989. Governing the $5 Trillion Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Stein, Herbert. 1994. Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Clinton. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.Google Scholar

Stein, Herbert. 1996. The Fiscal Revolution in America: Policy in Pursuit of Reality (2nd rev. ed.). Washington, DC: The AEI Press.Google Scholar

Stern, Gary H., and Feldman, Ron J.. 2004/2009. Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar

Stewart, Charles. 1989. Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives 1865–1921. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Stigler, George J. 1973. General Economic Conditions and National Elections. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 63: 160–7.Google Scholar

Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Bilmes, Linda J.. 2008. The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iran Conflict. New York: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar

Stiglitz, Joseph E., Sen, Amartya K., and Fitoussi, Jean-Paul. 2009. Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Google Scholar

Stock, James H., and Watson, Mark W.. 2002. Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why? In National Bureau of Economic Research, Macroeconomics Annual 17: 159–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Stockman, David. 1986. The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar

Stokes, Susan C. 2001. Mandates and Democracy; Neoliberalism by Surprise. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Su, Tsai-Tsu, Kamlet, Mark S., and Mowery, David C.. 1993. Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective. American Journal of Political Science 37: 213–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Subramanian, Arvind. 2011. Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics.Google Scholar

Summers, Lawrence H. 1990. Understanding Unemployment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System, rev. ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Sundquist, James L. 1992. Constitutional Reform and Effective Government, rev. ed. Washington: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Suskind, Ron. 2004. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill. New York: Simon & Shuster.Google Scholar

Suskind, Ron. 2011. Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a President. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.Google Scholar

Suzuki, Motoshi. 1991. The Rationality of Economic Voting and the Macro-economic Regime. American Journal of Political Science 35: 624–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Suzuki, Motoshi. 1994. Evolutionary Voter Sophistication and Political Business Cycles. Public Choice 81: 241–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Tabellini, Guido, and Alesina, Alberto. 1990. Voting on the Budget Deficit. American Economic Review 80: 37–49.Google Scholar

Tax Foundation. 2012 Putting a Face on America’s tax Returns: A Chart Book accessed May 20, 2013.

Taylor, John B. 1993. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39: 195–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Taylor, John B. 1999. A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules. In Taylor, John B. (ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, pp. 319–41. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Taylor, John B. 2009. Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.Google Scholar

Taylor, John B. 2010. Better Living through Monetary Economics In Siegfried, John (ed.), Better Living through Economics, pp. 146–63. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Taylor, John B. 2011. The Cycle of Rules and Discretion in Economic Policy. National Affairs 7(Spring): 55–65.Google Scholar

Temin, Peter. 1989. Lessons from the Great Depression. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Thaler, Richard H., and Sunstein, Cass R.. 2009. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New York: Penguin Books.Google Scholar

Therriault, Sean. 2008. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Timberlake, Richard H. 1978. The Origins of Central Banking in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Timberlake, Richard H. 1993. Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Tinbergen, Jan. 1952. On the Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam: North Holland.Google Scholar

Tobin, James, and Weidenbaum, Murray (eds.). 1988. Two Revolutions in Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartism. British Journal of Political Science 25: 289–325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Tufte, Edward R. 1978. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Vanhanen, Tatu. 2000. A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810–1998. Journal of Peace Research 37: 251–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wagner, Richard E. 2012. Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Walker, David M. 2008. U.S. Financial Conditions and Fiscal Future Briefing. Government Accountability Office. GAO-08–395CG. . Power Point slides presented at the 2008 Economic Forecast Forum, Research Triangle Park, NC, January 2.

Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1983. Economic Voting and the “Symbolic Politics” Argument: A Reinterpretation and a Synthesis. American Political Science Review 77: 92–111.Google Scholar

Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1987. The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles. Journal of Politics 49: 925–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1988. An Agenda Paper: Political Business Cycles and the Process of Economic Policymaking. American Politics Quarterly 16: 99–136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Weaver, R. Kent. 1988. Automatic Government: The Politics of Indexation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Weaver, R. Kent, and Rockman, Bert A. (eds.). 1993. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Weingast, Barry R., and Marshall, William J.. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Journal of Political Economy 96: 132–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Weise, Charles L. 2012. Political Pressures on Monetary Policy during the US Great Inflation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4(2): 33–64.Google Scholar

Wessel, David. 2009. In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic. New York: Crown Business.Google Scholar

Wessel, David. 2012. Red Ink: Inside the High-Stakes Politics of the Federal Budget. New York: Crown Business.Google Scholar

White, Joseph, and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1989. The Deficit and the Public Interest. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Whitely, Paul. 1986. Political Control of the Macroeconomy: The Political Economy of Public Policy Making. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Google Scholar

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1964. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar

Williams, John T. 1990. The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 84: 767–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship. American Political Science Review 84: 849–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wittman, Donald. 1983. Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories. American Political Science Review 77: 142–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wittman, Donald. 1989. Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results. Journal of Political Economy 97: 1395–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Woodford, Michael. 2009. Convergence in Macroeconomics: Elements of the New Synthesis. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1: 267–79.Google Scholar

Woon, Jonathan. 2012. Democratic Accountability and Retrospective Voting: A Laboratory Experiment. American Journal of Political Science 56: 773–1069.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Woolley, John T. 1984. Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wright, John R. 2012. Unemployment and the Democratic Electoral Advantage. American Political Science Review 106: 685–702.CrossRefGoogle Scholar