Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART ONE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
- PART TWO CONTINGENT SELECTION AND SYSTEMATIC EFFECTS: COUNTRY-LEVEL ANALYSES OF ELITE SELECTION, IDEATIONAL CHANGE, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE, 1991–2000
- 5 The Baltic States and Moldova
- 6 Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine
- 7 The Caucasus
- 8 Central Asia
- PART THREE COMPARING CASES
- Appendix A Measurement and Coding of Economic Ideas – Additional Tests
- Appendix B Interviews Conducted by the Author
- Bibliography
- Index
8 - Central Asia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART ONE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
- PART TWO CONTINGENT SELECTION AND SYSTEMATIC EFFECTS: COUNTRY-LEVEL ANALYSES OF ELITE SELECTION, IDEATIONAL CHANGE, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE, 1991–2000
- 5 The Baltic States and Moldova
- 6 Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine
- 7 The Caucasus
- 8 Central Asia
- PART THREE COMPARING CASES
- Appendix A Measurement and Coding of Economic Ideas – Additional Tests
- Appendix B Interviews Conducted by the Author
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In Central Asia, we see a much stronger case and one squarely consistent with the theory. For one, the separation between the selection of leaders and the selection of economic ideas is starker than anywhere else in the former Soviet Union. This is true for the simple reason that four of the five leaders were appointed while the Soviet Union was still in existence. Yet despite the fact that these leaders were not selected for their economic views, the ideas of those individual leaders came to be of particular importance because the extent of personal control over the state apparatus was so considerable. As a result, if the chapter tends more toward Kremlinology, drawing on the attributes of individual leaders, it is with good reason. The supreme power of the executive office in these countries renders the ideas, personal background, experience, and patronage ties of these leaders an important element of the explanation.
To capture this contingency, I describe how each leader came to power in order to make the case that the principles of selection had little to do with economic views. I then identify changes in the leaders' economic ideas over time and show the extent to which these ideas manifest in international institutional choice and economic policy.
UZBEKISTAN
Uzbekistan exhibits no changes in leadership and only one major shift in economic ideas during the decade, a turn from integralism to a form of mercantilism that occurs approximately at the end of 1993.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Economic Liberalism and Its RivalsThe Formation of International Institutions among the Post-Soviet States, pp. 200 - 228Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009