This book went to press at a time – August 1995 – when the peace process faced an impasse over the decommissioning of arms and the proposals of the Frameworks Documents (above, p. 2). Hopes remained high, however, for a positive outcome. As we make the final changes to this epilogue– in June 1996 – these hopes have greatly receded. In early September 1995 the political differences between the two governments became sharper and more public as a planned summit meeting was hastily cancelled. The visit by President Clinton to Belfast in November 1995 led to a temporary improvement. However further differences arose in January 1996 over the British response to the report of the Mitchell Commission on decommissioning and the announcement of elections in Northern Ireland as a precondition to all-party talks. Also, in early September, the Ulster Unionist Party elected a new leader, David Trimble, the most combative and abrasive of the candidates and – at face value – the least likely to entertain a compromise with nationalism.

Throughout the autumn republicans were expressing increasing concern at the slow progress of the peace process, in particular the failure to hold all-party talks, and warning that the process was in serious danger of collapse. On 9 February the IRA ended its ceasefire, exploding a bomb at Canary Wharf in London which killed two people, injured many more and caused £100m of damage. The two governments responded by reinstating the security measures put in abeyance after the ceasefires and curtailing their contacts with Sinn Féin representatives.