Introduction

Recent changes in diplomatic practice include a marked increase in peace and reconciliation efforts by third parties aimed not at interstate, but at intrastate, conflict. One immediate observation is that as war itself has shifted from being less of an interstate and more of an intrastate phenomenon, efforts to mediate have followed suit. A general one is that the shift from interstate to intrastate peace and reconciliation efforts also dovetails with a wider change in global politics, which has seen interaction change from being state-to-state (international) to being multi-actor and multiaxial (global).

This chapter treats third-party mediation of civic conflict as what, with Andrew Abbot, we refer to in the Introduction as a “thing of boundary,” that is, as a phenomenon over which a new profession, in this case diplomats, tries to claim authority, so that the profession's turf may expand. Where such practices come from will vary empirically. The case at hand in this chapter is the pioneer in institutionalizing this new set of diplomatic practices, namely Norway. Norwegian diplomacy seems first and foremost to be propelled by an interest in systems maintenance. Systems maintenance is of the essence for an agent such as Norway that, as a small state with an open economy, stands to gain a lot from upholding the system and has little or nothing to gain from its transformation.

The Introduction's emphasis on the need to see change in diplomatic practice not only in functional but also in constitutive terms invites us to pin down the nature of this change in diplomatic practice. A functional reading would note that the mentioned change in the system has thrown up new sand for diplomacy to grind. The set of agents in global politics has grown into something more manifold, and diplomats have followed suit. The intensity with which established great powers such as the United States but also Great Britain and France engage with third-party roles is increasing. So is the number of engaged actors. A constitutive reading would see this change in diplomatic practice not as a task-solving response to wider change, but as a constitutive part of that change.