Slote begins an interesting paper with the remark that the question of whether human beings have free will has long been considered one of the most important in philosophy for, among other things, the assumption that free will is necessary to moral responsibility and vital to ethics. He goes on to argue, however, that there are forms of ethics that are possible in the absence of metaphysical freedom (1990: 369). In this chapter, I will start by considering a version of virtue ethics developed by Slote that he believes is compatible with determinism. I will follow by questioning some aspects of the compatibility claim. Then I will consider a sketch of another version of a virtue ethical theory offered by Watson. This theory does seem compatible with determinism, but I argue that the concepts of rightness, wrongness, and obligatoriness supported by this theory are far removed from our ordinary deontic understanding of them. So even if this version of virtue ethics survives pressure from determinism, it won't sustain the view that deontic anchors (as I have been conceptualizing them) are possible in deterministic worlds. Further, if there are significant costs to not having such anchors, as indeed there are, such a virtue ethics will not be able to recoup these losses. Finally, I will end by arguing for the “independence” of deontic moral appraisals: Such appraisals are distinct from various other modes of moral appraisal such as, for example, appraisals of praise- or blameworthiness, and axiological ones concerned with the instrumental, intrinsic, or overall goodness of states of affairs.