Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-dfsvx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T12:35:01.939Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

6 - Welfare, Politics, and Taxation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 October 2009

Walter Hettich
Affiliation:
California State University, Fullerton
Stanley L. Winer
Affiliation:
Carleton University, Ottawa
Get access

Summary

The problem of efficiency, however, is so vital that we cannot ignore it merely because our answers to it are not complete. Welfare economics, despite its limitations, provides partial answers; and I feel that to provide partial answers to vital problems is at least as important as it is to provide complete answers to lesser questions.

Tibor Scitovsky (1951, p. xi)

This chapter represents an exploration of a more inclusive welfare economics of taxation. Its nature, like that of any new enterprise, is of necessity somewhat tentative. The emphasis is on presenting an outline of ideas and illustrating them with relevant examples. Whereas some sections develop a formal analysis, others take a more intuitive approach. The organization of the material is based on the conclusions reached in the preceding chapter, where we sketched three steps required for a comprehensive welfare analysis in the presence of collective choice. (See Section 5.3.)

We begin here with the selection of the standard of reference against which to judge collective choice outcomes. This, together with a consideration of the conditions under which equilibrium policy outcomes will achieve the standard, constitutes the first step. Economists have devoted much effort to working out such an analysis for an economy with private markets, and it has been one of the important achievements of the discipline to show that an economic system with competitive markets will yield optimal (Pareto-efficient) outcomes under carefully defined conditions.

Type
Chapter
Information
Democratic Choice and Taxation
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
, pp. 121 - 150
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×