Much political and democratic theory in the Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian era is located at the site of the tension between liberalism and communitarianism. The perceived tension, simply put, lies in disagreements over the source of morality. Liberals appeal to a universal, supposedly rational, minimal Kantian standard that they believe everyone could agree to (Rawls 1971; Macedo 1990). Communitarians believe that standards of morality derive from community, and are therefore particular. The community must, as a consequence, have a place in public life (Bellah 1991; Walzer 1997; Maclntyre 1984). Partly because this debate does in fact rest on irreconcilable differences regarding fundamental principles, it has largely stalemated. The enterprise now is to find a “third way” between, and yet separate from, the two. This is the project of Isaac, Filner, and Bivins in their contribution to this book. The dominant line of attack in their argument is against political liberalism; yet they hesitate to embrace communitarianism. They invite the community into the public realm and make an appeal to democracy to adjudicate the conflicts their invitation will engender. Democracy, they hope, can include communities, and yet still provide a universal standard.

In order that we begin from the same set of premises, I outline briefly and sympathetically what I take to be the argument of Isaac, Filner, and Bivins, hereafter known as “IFB.” IFB's argument is constructed around a critique of Macedo's defense of political liberalism in the case of Mozert v. Hawkins (Macedo 1995).