Introduction

I begin with a summary of Riker's two claims of disequilibrium relating to the politics of the Wilmot Proviso. In 1846 President Polk requested an emergency appropriation in effect to commence the acquisition of the northern half of Mexico. The Wilmot Proviso was an amendment moved by northern Democrats in the House of Representatives to prohibit slavery in the lands to be acquired from Mexico. Riker's first claim of disequilibrium is that initially the least-desired alternative of no appropriations and no antislavery proviso prevailed in the House. His second claim of disequilibrium is that there was a cycle among legislators' preferences among the status quo, the acquisition appropriation, and the appropriation proposal with the antislavery amendment. Then I present a more far-ranging and critical review of Riker's second claim and then of his first claim. The problem with Riker's second claim is that he misreads the vote in the Congressional record. A corrected reading shows that there was no cycle. The problem with Riker's first claim is that it lacks context. A more thorough investigation discloses that the appropriation initially failed not due to some profound disequilibrium, but rather due to mischiefs and blunders. Finally, I present my own interpretation of the votes in question. By means of analysis of roll-call votes I am able to offer a fresh interpretation of the Wilmot Proviso controversy in Congress, including an explanation of how the Proviso was defeated.