France's long-standing hostility toward, and fear of, Germany led to the Dual Alliance with Russia, and the entente cordiale with Great Britain. These provided the framework for Germany's diplomatic isolation. After 1911, as war seemed more and more likely, French financial support for a massive Russian military program scheduled to be completed in 1917 gave Germany's military leaders reason to fight sooner rather than later. In the immediate crisis of July 1914, with French support assured, Russia mobilized against Austria-Hungary and Germany, Germany declared war, and the Austro-Serbian conflict was turned into a European war.

In many respects, the French government's goal in July 1914 was to avoid making decisions. For any action taken in that highly incendiary situation could contribute to igniting a conflagration that France did not want and for which it did not wish to be responsible. Against this motive for inaction, however, were the countervailing imperatives of the Franco-Russian alliance. Crucially, France had to avoid arousing Russian fears that French support was in any sense uncertain. To treat support for Russia as a matter for decision was to imply that France had the option of abandoning its ally and, conversely, that Russia was free to abandon France. In short, France's leaders had to adhere wholeheartedly to the alliance and to act as if the nation had no options at all.