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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2010

Jeffrey N. Gordon
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
Mark J. Roe
Affiliation:
Professor of Corporate Law, Harvard Law School
Jeffrey N. Gordon
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York
Mark J. Roe
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
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Summary

Corporate governance is on the reform agenda all over the world. The remarkable political economy of the post-Cold War era has made both democracy and market-oriented capitalism ascendant, even if not inevitably linked. Competition among radically different economic systems – communism vs. capitalism – has abated. States are withdrawing from ownership of the means of production by privatizing state-firms and withdrawing from strong control by deregulating widely. Economic decisions once made by the state are increasingly left to autonomous, privately owned firms. Even if private corporate governance characteristics continue to differ, the most general of economic contrasts – private vs. government direction – is fading.

Global economic integration has been a key factor in the salience of corporate governance questions. Once confined to local economies, differently governed firms now compete with one another, as multilateral trade agreements and regional economic blocks such as the European Union have internationalized product markets, capital markets, managerial markets, and, to a lesser extent, labor markets.

Globalization affects the corporate governance reform agenda in two ways. First, it heightens anxiety over whether particular corporate governance systems confer competitive economic advantage. As trade barriers erode, the locally protected product marketplace disappears. A country's firms' performance is more easily measured against global standards. Poor performance shows up more quickly when a competitor takes away market share, or innovates quickly.

National decisionmakers must consider whether to protect locally favored corporate governance regimes if they regard the local regime as weakening local firms in product markets or capital markets.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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  • Introduction
  • Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia University, New York, Mark J. Roe, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 04 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511665905.001
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  • Introduction
  • Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia University, New York, Mark J. Roe, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 04 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511665905.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia University, New York, Mark J. Roe, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 04 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511665905.001
Available formats
×