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Chapter Three - When governments write contracts: Policy and expertise in sovereign debt markets

from Part One - Contracts and sovereign debt obligations: The evolution of contractual provisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2016

Grégoire Mallard
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
Jérôme Sgard
Affiliation:
Sciences Po, Paris
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Chapter
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Contractual Knowledge
One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets
, pp. 92 - 117
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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