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Chapter Four - Market rules: Social conventions, legal fictions, and the organization of sovereign debt markets in the long twentieth century

from Part One - Contracts and sovereign debt obligations: The evolution of contractual provisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2016

By
Stephen C. Nelson
Edited by
Grégoire Mallard  and
Jérôme Sgard
Grégoire Mallard
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
Jérôme Sgard
Affiliation:
Sciences Po, Paris
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Type
Chapter
Information
Contractual Knowledge
One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets
 , pp. 118 - 150
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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