I shall use the following additional abbreviations for referring to Kant’s works: GMS (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), KpV (Critique of Practical Reason), KrV (Critique of Pure Reason), MdS (Metaphysics of Morals). Page references cite volume: page number of the Prussian Academy Edition of Kant’s collected works. Only the references to KrV cite the page numbers of the original A and B editions.
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