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  • Cited by 1
  • Print publication year: 2006
  • Online publication date: June 2012

6 - Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice


The relation of preference between acts or options is the key element of decision theory that provides the basis for the measurement of utility or value. In axiomatic treatments of decision theory, the concept of preference appears as an abstract relation that is given an empirical interpretation through specific methods of elicitation, such as choice and matching. In choice the decision maker selects an option from an offered set of two or more alternatives. In matching the decision maker is required to set the value of some variable to achieve an equivalence between options (e.g., what chance to win $750 is as attractive as 1 chance in 10 to win $2,500?).

The standard analysis of choice assumes procedure invariance: Normatively equivalent procedures for assessing preferences should give rise to the same preference order. Indeed, theories of measurement generally require the ordering of objects to be independent of the particular method of assessment. In classical physical measurement, it is commonly assumed that each object possesses a well-defined quantity of the attribute in question (e.g., length, mass) and that different measurement procedures elicit the same ordering of objects with respect to this attribute. Analogously, the classical theory of preference assumes that each individual has a well-defined preference order (or a utility function) and that different methods of elicitation produce the same ordering of options. To determine the heavier of two objects, for example, we can place them on the two sides of a pan balance and observe which side goes down.

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