Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-ckgrl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-19T08:28:20.519Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: the Allies and the Ruhr, 1944–1950

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2009

John Gillingham
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, St Louis
Get access

Summary

To travel from Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan is to move from an American wartime proposal to destroy Ruhr industry to the actual organization of Europe around it little more than five years later. It is also to cross from the threshold of one short and unhappy era into a far longer and better one, passing from the material devastation, political chaos, intellectual confusion, and moral doubt left in the wake of the war to the recovery, reorganization, and renewal of confidence that would lead the way to more than a generation of unbroken peace, increasing prosperity, and improved social welfare. Between 1945 and 1950 changes normally requiring decades to develop and unfold took place within the space of only a few years, too rapidly to be fully recognized at the time or completely understood even now. The Germans had to give up their national ambitions, accept the military and moral verdict of the war, and somehow draw the appropriate lessons from it. The French had to force themselves out of a national mood of fatalism and complacency – a habitual shoulder shrugging – and endure the discomforts, pains, and occasional agonies of modernization. The United States had to play successfully the new historical role that World War II had thrust upon it as the only remaining great power in Europe west of the Elbe.

The United States laid out the route that led to a German return to Europe and set the pace for the voyage along it. Aware also that any attempt to extend its power west of the Elbe would encounter the united opposition of the three western Allies.

Type
Chapter
Information
Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955
The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community
, pp. 97 - 177
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×