Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Documents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Intelligence for an American Century: Creating the CIA
- 2 The Development of CIA Covert Action
- 3 A ‘Gangster Act’: The Berlin Tunnel
- 4 The CIA and the USSR: The Challenge of Understanding the Soviet Threat
- 5 Anglo-American Intelligence Liaison and the Outbreak of the Korean War
- 6 The CIA and the Bomber and Missile Gap
- 7 The CIA and Cuba: The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis
- 8 The CIA in Vietnam
- 9 The CIA and Arms Control
- 10 The CIA’s Counter-Intelligence Conundrum: The Case of Yuri Nosenko
- 11 1975: The Year of the ‘Intelligence Wars’
- 12 Watching Khomeini
- 13 The CIA and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
- 14 Martial Law in Poland
- 15 Able Archer and the NATO War Scare
- 16 The Soviet Leadership and Kremlinology in the 1980s
- 17 The CIA and the (First) Persian Gulf War
- 18 A Mole in Their Midst: The CIA and Aldrich Ames
- 19 ‘The System was Blinking Red’: The Peace Dividend and the Road to 9/11
- 20 Reckoning and Redemption: The 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA at War
- 21 The ‘Slam Dunk’: The CIA and the Invasion of Iraq
- 22 The Terrorist Hunters Become Political Quarry: The CIA and Rendition, Detention and Interrogation
- 23 Innovation at the CIA: From Sputnik to Silicon Valley and Venona to Vault 7
- 24 Entering the Electoral Fray: The CIA and Russian Meddling in the 2016 Election
- 25 Flying Blind? The CIA and the Trump Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
16 - The Soviet Leadership and Kremlinology in the 1980s
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 September 2020
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Documents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Intelligence for an American Century: Creating the CIA
- 2 The Development of CIA Covert Action
- 3 A ‘Gangster Act’: The Berlin Tunnel
- 4 The CIA and the USSR: The Challenge of Understanding the Soviet Threat
- 5 Anglo-American Intelligence Liaison and the Outbreak of the Korean War
- 6 The CIA and the Bomber and Missile Gap
- 7 The CIA and Cuba: The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis
- 8 The CIA in Vietnam
- 9 The CIA and Arms Control
- 10 The CIA’s Counter-Intelligence Conundrum: The Case of Yuri Nosenko
- 11 1975: The Year of the ‘Intelligence Wars’
- 12 Watching Khomeini
- 13 The CIA and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
- 14 Martial Law in Poland
- 15 Able Archer and the NATO War Scare
- 16 The Soviet Leadership and Kremlinology in the 1980s
- 17 The CIA and the (First) Persian Gulf War
- 18 A Mole in Their Midst: The CIA and Aldrich Ames
- 19 ‘The System was Blinking Red’: The Peace Dividend and the Road to 9/11
- 20 Reckoning and Redemption: The 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA at War
- 21 The ‘Slam Dunk’: The CIA and the Invasion of Iraq
- 22 The Terrorist Hunters Become Political Quarry: The CIA and Rendition, Detention and Interrogation
- 23 Innovation at the CIA: From Sputnik to Silicon Valley and Venona to Vault 7
- 24 Entering the Electoral Fray: The CIA and Russian Meddling in the 2016 Election
- 25 Flying Blind? The CIA and the Trump Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Most academic attention on the Soviet system in the 1980s has focused on General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's dual policies of perestroika (reforms) and glasnost (openness) and how the Soviet system imploded. Far less studied, and certainly no less important, is the precise focus on the leaders of the Soviet Union and how their different approaches affected the political, economic and military course the country followed. By the early 1980s the Soviet leadership of the worldwide communist movement appeared to be running out of ideas. In the Kremlin was the aging and increasingly paranoid leader Leonid Brezhnev. He had ruled since 1964, but his involvement at a senior level extended to the period of Stalin’s rule. His tenure had seen an increase in military expenditure but this had been coupled with a growth in economic and industrial stagnation. The CIA keenly monitored his health and well-being, just as they had with his predecessors, and there was little surprise in late 1982 when he died.
A common aspect of the CIA's work was ‘Kremlinology’: the precise watching of individuals within the Soviet system, looking at the movers and shakers, studying those rising and falling politically and pondering what it all meant. With Brezhnev having been ill for so long there had been lots of attention and discussion about who might replace him. Brezhnev had surrounded himself with other aging, old Soviet hands. Would one of these be the successor, or might someone younger take the helm? Such questions were consequential not only for the Soviet Union itself, but also for the CIA and the policymakers it informed.
The debate cannot have lasted long. Within twenty-four hours of Brezhnev's death, his replacement had been chosen: Yuri Andropov. Andropov was no stranger to power, having risen up through the Soviet system. He was ambassador to Hungary in 1956 at the time of the uprising and forcibly urged a swift and brutal Soviet military response. This experience persuaded him that any opposition to Soviet rule should be dealt with in the harshest possible manner, and a year after taking over as head of the KGB in 1968, he urged that the Czechoslovak liberalisation movement under Alexander Dubček be crushed. He remained the head of the KGB until his appointment to replace Brezhnev in 1982.
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- Information
- The CIA and the Pursuit of SecurityHistory, Documents and Contexts, pp. 308 - 340Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2020