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6 - Participation and Compliance: Analysis of Variation and Hypothesis Testing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2017

Jonathan R. Stromseth
Affiliation:
Brookings Institution, Washington DC
Edmund J. Malesky
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Dimitar D. Gueorguiev
Affiliation:
Syracuse University, New York
Lai Hairong
Affiliation:
Peking University, Beijing
Wang Xixin
Affiliation:
Peking University, Beijing
Carl Brinton
Affiliation:
Harvard Business School
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Summary

<span class='bold'>Abstract</span>

In this chapter, we assess the core empirical predictions developed in Chapter 5 – namely, that public participation in policy formulation contributes to less contentious and more effective policy outcomes. Previous work has hinted at such predictions but has forgone testing them empirically due to the difficulty of measuring participation and policy outcomes. Determined to create such measures, we combed through government websites, almanacs, and national archives for records of participatory activity. Specifically, we focus on public consultation, a form of participation that allows members of the public to critique government policies in a less confrontational manner. Armed with original data on public consultation, we looked for effects on mass contestation, popular grievances, and policy compliance contained in official reports and yearbooks. Comparing across provinces and over time, we show that higher rates of consultation are associated with less contestation and greater compliance. Focusing on labor policy, we find that more consultation is associated with fewer labor disputes. With regard to environmental policy, we find little support for the claim that consultation improves implementation, although we do find evidence that provinces with denser civil society networks and higher rates of consultation perform better in wastewater management. These findings are the first step in clarifying the opaque role of public participation in China’s unique model of authoritarian governance.

Type
Chapter
Information
China's Governance Puzzle
Enabling Transparency and Participation in a Single-Party State
, pp. 192 - 242
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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