Book contents
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgement
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- Part I Monetary Economics and Policy
- Part II Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy
- Part III Foreign Exchanges and International Architecture
- Part IV The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
- 19 Overburdened Central Banks
- 20 Central Banks, National Balance Sheets and Global Balance
- 21 Recognising the Economy as a Complex, Adaptive System
- 22 The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Index
- References
19 - Overburdened Central Banks
Can Independence Survive?
from Part IV - The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2018
By
Book contents
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgement
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- Part I Monetary Economics and Policy
- Part II Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy
- Part III Foreign Exchanges and International Architecture
- Part IV The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
- 19 Overburdened Central Banks
- 20 Central Banks, National Balance Sheets and Global Balance
- 21 Recognising the Economy as a Complex, Adaptive System
- 22 The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Index
- References
Summary
The history of central bank independence has seen ups and downs. Their reputation reached an historic peak after the great moderation and the financial crisis. Since then expectations on the role of central banks, not only in crisis management but beyond, in controlling the macroecomic situation have been exaggerated. Central banks are also confronted with new responsibilities and competences. The ECB is a special case considering its political role to keep the eurozone together. Central banks are overburdened. It will be hard if not impossible to meet those heightened expectations. As a consequence the status of their independence will come under heavy pressure.
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- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking , pp. 335 - 340Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018
References
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