How might unitarism, parliamentarism, and closed-list PR improve the quality of governance within democratic polities? Having outlined the broad theoretical parameters of the argument in chapter one, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of causal pathways. Chapter two focuses on the effects of these constitutional institutions on the creation and maintenance of a form of rule known as party government. Chapter three addresses the probable effects of these institutions in mediating extreme forms of political conflict, particularly conflict rooted in ethnic identities. And chapter four attempts to demonstrate why centripetal institutions may do a better job of coordinating diverse policies across the various levels and institutions of government.

Throughout this discussion, our narrative foil is the theory of decentralism, introduced in chapter one. At each stage, we attempt to show why centripetal institutions might be expected to produce better governance than decentralist institutions. Granted, many of our arguments must remain speculative, for we do not know – and are not in a position to test empirically – many of the stipulated causal pathways. Yet it is essential that we lay out in fairly detailed terms why centripetal institutions might lead to better governance, overall, within a democratic framework. The goal of this section of the book is to convince the reader that there is a strong prima facie case for the theory. This forms the background for our empirical tests of the theory, as laid out in the second section of the book.