Cavour was never again to be so passive as he had been when the Thousand first set out. Thereafter, however much he may have been on occasion playing second fiddle to Garibaldi, he always had, if not a positive policy, at least some hypotheses for a policy. The chief difficulty is to disentangle these various hypotheses; for Cavour instinctively tried to keep his freedom of manoeuvre so as to be prepared for any eventuality. He had to be ready to accept Garibaldi's success, but also to disown his failure; to accept annexation of the south, but also to score any point against what were called—still with a pejorative connotation—the italianissimi.

Throughout June and July his main object was to see that the Sicilian revolution avoided the two extremes of failure or overmuch success; and on occasion he was able to contribute materially towards preserving this nice balance. But it was a delicate and dangerous task. Garibaldi's failure would not have been an unmitigated disaster, for it would have arrested the revolution, and given Cavour the several years he sought to consolidate the existing kingdom of northern Italy. Yet public opinion in Italy would not lightly have forgiven Cavour for allowing its hero to perish, and he would have hopelessly alienated the radical element in Italian politics which he relied on being alternately his stalking-horse, his scapegoat, and the combustible tinder and ignition spark needed for the next insurrection.