In a theory of justice, Rawls defines a “sense of justice” as a moral sentiment that involves “an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice” (TJ 497). In a well-ordered society, this entails “an effective desire to comply with the existing rules and to give one another that to which they are entitled” (TJ 274–275). It also requires that we “do our part in maintaining these arrangements” and that we are willing “to work for (or at least not to oppose) the setting up of just institutions, and for the reform of existing ones when justice requires it . . . And this inclination goes beyond the support of those particular schemes that have affirmed our good” (TJ 415). This moral sentiment is essential for the stability of a well-ordered society, and its presence underwrites the equal status of citizens. Indeed, one way to understand the project of developing a theory of justice, as Rawls understands it, is as an attempt to characterize one’s sense of justice in reflective equilibrium.