Somewhat surprisingly, there is no index entry under “rights” in either A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. Part of the explanation is that many of the rights Rawls is committed to defending – including those to which he assigns a certain priority as “basic” rights – are often referred to simply as “liberties” (for which there are rather elaborate index entries). Consequently, his views about rights are often expressed obliquely, typically through the accounts he gives of the practical implications (for the shaping of institutions and practices) of the principles of “justice as fairness.” Thus, most of the rights he regards as “basic” are identified and described when he itemizes the liberties protected by the equal liberty principle. “The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law” (TJ 61). Other rights are linked to the opportunities secured under the auspices of the fair equality of opportunity principle, including (notably) rights to equality of educational and occupational opportunity. “(F)air equality of opportunity means a certain set of institutions that assures similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated and keeps positions and offices open to all on the basis of qualities and efforts reasonably related to the relevant duties and tasks” (TJ 278, 83–90).