Rawls’s conception of the economy plays an important role in A Theory of Justice. First, economic institutions constitute a part of the basic structure of society and as such must be regulated by principles of justice. Secondly, his conception sets the stage for his own institutional model of just economic relations and this model indicates the ways existing society would need to be transformed to conform to the demands of justice. Thirdly, the institutional model plays a key role in establishing that his theory of justice meets his test of stability and well-orderedness: the theory can be embodied in institutions that are stable because they generate voluntary support by its members based on their shared sense that they are just and are widely regarded as such (TJ 4–5, 192–933, 397–399; JF 8–10, 124–126, 184–188; Freeman 2007b, 245–253). Finally, Rawls’s account of a just economy is the most provocative feature of his theory of justice, providing a litmus test of its rational acceptability. His account implies a sharp critique of existing capitalist societies and defends a radical transformation of the ways they distribute income, wealth, and economic and political power. Rawls’s defense of political equality – equal civil and political rights – is an important but familiar liberal ideal. On the other hand, his defense of economic egalitarianism challenges the common idea that socioeconomic inequality is either an inevitable, desirable, or fair feature of modern society, based on unequal talent, productivity, merit, and desert – with “winners and losers.” Rawls also rejects the idea that there are natural property rights and natural market relations that justify economic inequalities.