POST-TJ, RAWLS DEVELOPS his new views on autonomy on numerous occasions where he feels the necessity to introduce new subcategories. First, in PL and in his 1980s papers, he introduces the central distinction between moral and political autonomy (PL xliv and 29–35). Second, he develops the idea of “doctrinal autonomy (PL 98 and 110–116). Third, he describes the Kantian interpretation of autonomy as “constitutive” and as different from his own political constructivism (PL 99 and 125). Fourth, he introduces a distinction between the rational autonomy of the parties in the OP and the full autonomy of citizens as a way to lift misunderstandings on his view of rationality (PL 72–81). Then, he answers the crucial question of the conlicts between personal identity and political autonomy with an appeal to autonomy (PL 140). In his “Reply to Habermas” (PL 396–421), he proposes further elucidations that insist on the convergences between political liberalism and civic republicanism as both guaranteeing citizens’ full autonomy. In LP, inally, he builds his argument against both cosmopolitanism and political realism on a conception of peoples as entitled to political autonomy and self-determination as well as the respect that goes with it in view of their moral identity (LP 79, 118, 146, and 106–112).