The basic concepts of speech act theory

Speech act theory originated during the 1950s in the ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin and continued most notably in the work of John Searle. The following discussion surveys its impact on literary studies up until 1990. This impact was powerful and quickly achieved. Indeed, by 1975, Quentin Skinner was able to assert the centrality of speech act theory, pointing to the vital influence of Austin and Searle on the two new ‘orthodoxies’ that challenged formalism by stressing that both intention and context were necessary for understanding (‘Hermeneutics’, passim). Yet barely a decade later, Vincent Leitch could write a history of American literary criticism from the 1930s to the 1980s without reference to Austin, and with only two tangential mentions of Searle. Granted, Skinner and Leitch present extreme views on the value of speech act theory; but their respective claims reflect a real shift in critical perspective. Once a major theoretical position, speech act theory is remembered today primarily as what, following Richard Rorty, might be called the ‘straight person’ (‘Deconstruction and circumvention’, p. 2) for one of Jacques Derrida's more famous deconstructive performances. What caused the initial enthusiasm, and why did the promise not materialize?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to move back from literature to examine the philosophical premises of speech act theory. In a way, this is easier with speech act theory than with most philosophical movements, since it has its origins in a single, specific text: Austin's How to do Things with Words, originally delivered as the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955, and posthumously published in 1962.