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39 - Legislative Decision-Making

from Part V - Other Legal Decision-Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2024

By
Clayton D. Peoples ,
Samantha Both  and
Callista Ziwei Chim
Edited by
Monica K. Miller ,
Logan A. Yelderman ,
Matthew T. Huss  and
Jason A. Cantone
Monica K. Miller
Affiliation:
University of Nevada, Reno
Logan A. Yelderman
Affiliation:
Prairie View A & M University, Texas
Matthew T. Huss
Affiliation:
Creighton University, Omaha
Jason A. Cantone
Affiliation:
George Mason University, Virginia
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Summary

This chapter focuses on legal decisions often neglected in the general field of psychology and law: legislative decisions. These decisions establish the legal framework within which other entities operate. The chapter begins with a description of the legislative branch and a summary of different types of legislative decisions. It then differentiates between democratic and nondemocratic settings (e.g. oligarchies, autocracies) and concisely covers theories of power structure – namely, state-centered theory, pluralist theory, and elite-power theory. It then moves on to identifying and expounding the factors that influence legislative decisions. In democratic contexts, these factors include variables internal to the legislature, such as lawmaker demographics, social ties/networks, and party/ideology, as well as external variables such as public opinion, media, and campaign contributions/lobbying. In nondemocratic contexts, however, legislative decisions are largely influenced by power, wealth, and corruption. The chapter concludes by discussing implications for theories of power structure and proposing future directions.

Keywords

legislative decision-makingroll call votinglawmakinglegislaturescorruption
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Legal Decision-Making , pp. 599 - 616
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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