Throughout most of the twentieth century an exceedingly narrow interpretation and application of the utilitarian rationale for intellectual property protection dominated much of Western intellectual property (IP) law and policy.1 This was especially evident in the United States, wherein an economic incentive/commodification approach to IP social utility pervaded IP jurisprudence and scholarly discourse. In essence, that limited perception of the utilitarian economic incentive approach to stimulating IP endeavor, including among other things, the production of patentable inventions and copyrightable expressive works, was premised on the belief that IP endeavor is most effectively promoted by providing individuals with nearly absolute property rights in their IP output and the accompanying prospect of monetary rewards for their intellectual labors. Concomitantly, the commercial marketplace would not only determine the “rules of engagement” for IP production and dissemination, but also incentivize and determine the quality and quantity of IP output. Such an approach would result, by design, in IP innovators and creators devoting their energies to producing the kind of IP products that the public was willing to pay for, with little incentive to engage in “nonessential” IP activity unlikely to bring adequate economic returns.