In 1992, an article was incorporated by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government regulations on the use of genetic material should take into account the dignity of non-human beings. Paragraph 1 of the article states:

According to the legal interpretation, the dignity of non-human beings pertains to all individual organisms, animals, plants and micro-organisms. What is meant by the dignity of non-human beings? How does it relate to human dignity? And why should we ascribe it to all non-human beings? If animals had dignity, their moral status might be the same or at least close to the one humans have. They might have, provided that dignity is the basis of human rights, the same rights humans have. On the other hand, if they do not have dignity, the rights humans have might trump the claims that could be made on behalf of animals.

Non-human and human dignity

One might argue that the dignity of non-human beings is just an extension of the concept of human dignity. What we ascribe to humans when we talk of their dignity is also something that should be ascribed to non-humans. Of course, the meaning of the concept of human dignity is contested. But, one could argue, whatever turns out to be the proper understanding of human dignity, it should also be ascribed to non-humans. But why should we do this? Advocates of the view that we should extend dignity to all living organisms give two reasons: first, humans would not have the properties due to which they have dignity if there were no other living organisms. Dignity pertains also to the necessary conditions of the properties which convey dignity to humans. Second, Living organisms have their own teleonomic structure, they are beings that pursue their own ends.