Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- 36 Heuristics and Biases in the Criminology of Compliance
- 37 Prospect Theory and Tax Compliance
- 38 Nudging Compliance
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
36 - Heuristics and Biases in the Criminology of Compliance
from Part VI - Compliance and Cognition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- 36 Heuristics and Biases in the Criminology of Compliance
- 37 Prospect Theory and Tax Compliance
- 38 Nudging Compliance
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
Summary
Abstract: In criminology, compliance is a central focus of the deterrence and rational choice perspectives on crime. In turn, these perspectives have been guided by traditional microeconomics. Behavioral economics, a recent branch of economics which pivots from and amplifies economic theories, has increasingly informed decision-making on a range of matters, including public health and finance. Criminologists have begun to marshal behavioral economic insights to better understand decisions surrounding crime and transgression. Prominent in behavioral economics are heuristics and biases in judgments under uncertainty. These involve shortcuts, rules of thumb, and other deviations from traditional economic norms, in how people navigate uncertainty. This chapter discusses how various biases and heuristics from behavioral economics research affect one of the most prominent decision-making constructs in criminology and compliance – perceptions about the likelihood of punishment for a contemplated transgression.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 531 - 540Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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