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17 - Corporate Crime Deterrence

from Part II - Deterrence and Incapacitation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2021

By
Melissa Rorie  and
Natalie Schell-Busey
Edited by
Benjamin van Rooij  and
D. Daniel Sokol
Benjamin van Rooij
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Amsterdam
D. Daniel Sokol
Affiliation:
University of Florida
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Summary

Abstract: This chapter examines what is known about corporate crime deterrence in hopes of identifying legal strategies that can prevent such crimes and their often-immense harms against consumers, competitors, employees, creditors, and owners. In this chapter, we rely heavily on results from a meta-analytic study of corporate crime deterrence research but also examine the extant literature in an effort to summarize what formal mechanisms might be effective in promoting compliance. Despite increasing awareness of the frequency and consequences of these violations, research has produced almost no conclusive recommendations. We find that simply making new corporate crime laws is ineffective, while actual criminal justice sanctions (e.g., arrest, incarceration) seem to be inconsistently effective. There is some support for the use of fines and monetary sanctions (both civil and criminal) in producing compliance, but financial penalties seem to be effective only in the short term and only when they are very high. Furthermore, in our review, regulatory sanctions seem to be effective against individual-level offending, but these sanctions have wildly inconsistent impacts when leveled against corporations. We discuss the dire need for more research, offering specific suggestions for scholarship.

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Chapter
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The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 219 - 235
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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