Redistributive taxation, Robert Nozick famously argued, is morally ‘ on par with forced labor’. This chapter aims to counter that his argument for this conclusion rests on a presupposition that entails the moral acceptability of redistributive taxation. In more detail, a distinction is drawn between benefit and redistributive taxation under which the former but not the latter is morally acceptable. However, any form of taxation presupposes a society where there is a background of trust. It requires that cooperation be possible and widespread. This is only possible given that we trust one another in a certain way – that we can, and do, see a trusting party ‘ s dependence on us not as an opportunity to exploit but as a reason to prove ourselves trustworthy. This background of trust then entails some concern for others ‘ welfare. It is then a short argument from our possession of this concern at the individual level to the legitimacy of redistributive taxation. As such, there can be no fundamental philosophical division between benefit taxation and redistributive taxation. Both, one might say, are levied for goods we care about.