Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-5wvtr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T23:38:29.040Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Appendix D: India Voters' Survey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Susan C. Stokes
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Thad Dunning
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Marcelo Nazareno
Affiliation:
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
Valeria Brusco
Affiliation:
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
Get access

Summary

Our voters' survey in the Indian states of Karnataka, Bihar, and Rajasthan took place in the context of a study of the effect of caste-based quotas in local village councils (see Dunning 2010, Dunning and Nilekani 2012). To select our study group of councils (called gram panchayats), we first purposively sampled six districts in Karnataka, which vary in terms of strength of different parties and locally dominant castes. We took advantage of the procedure by which quotas rotate across councils in different electoral terms to construct a regression-discontinuity (RD) design, in which the assignment to caste-based quotas was either truly randomized or as good a randomly assigned (see Dunning 2009). Using this RD design, we constructed a study group of 200 village council constituencies, 100 of which had their presidencies reserved for Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe presidents in 2007 and 100 of which were unreserved or reserved for Backward Classes. Although council constituencies were selected according to the RD design, rather than by a probability sampling scheme, and although the six included districts were purposively sampled, means on a variety of covariates are quite similar in our selected councils and in a statewide dataset, suggesting that our sample may be quite representative of the state of Karnataka. Indeed, as the final column of Table Appendix D.1 shows, the data are consistent with a simple random sample from the underlying population of village councils.

Type
Chapter
Information
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
The Puzzle of Distributive Politics
, pp. 297 - 298
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×