In the previous chapter, we saw that Hutcheson's moral sense theory gave rise to a number of worries: the worry of moral relativism, the worry about internal conflict, and the worry about finding a place for God. In this chapter, I examine how Hutcheson tried to dispel these worries. In Section A, I outline the general shape of Hutcheson's response, explaining why he thought that establishing an explanatory asymmetry between virtue and vice could dispel all the worries in one fell swoop. In B, I describe the details of Hutcheson's argument for this all-important explanatory asymmetry – an argument that relies on his use of the Lockean notion of the association of ideas. And in C, I sum up Hutcheson's Positive Answer and point to some aspects of it that Hume would later target.

Hutcheson's Need for Explanatory Asymmetry

Hutcheson acknowledged that people sometimes have moral conflicts with one another and that individuals sometimes have within themselves conflicting passions (Passions and Affections 127–8, 146–54). But he believed that all of these interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts were due to one of two things: either a false belief or an unnatural affection.

Hutcheson's view of false beliefs leading to interpersonal moral conflict is pretty easy to explain (Beauty and Virtue 196–202). If one person believes that a course of action will create great happiness for humanity and another person believes that the same course of action will create great unhappiness, then the two of them will have different views about the moral status of that course of action.