A book on British relations with Latin America cannot avoid addressing the Falklands question directly. It may become wearisome to revisit themes that became over-familiar in 1982 and 1983, but we have to remind ourselves that this spectacular breakdown in our relations with a major Latin American republic came about in some small part through British failures and through a change in Britain's position in the region. The failures can be recalled by a simple list: the eyes not on the ball, ‘Micawberism’, the ‘wrong signals’, the reluctance of frontbenchers in the major parties to grasp a minor but thorny issue, the assumption that our order of priorities would somehow always prevail, a forgetfulness about anniversaries… The best analysis that has been attempted since the war has been Michael Charlton's radio series, Little Platoon, which surely deserves to be published before general oblivion descends. The change in Britain's position to which I refer is simply stated, though often overlooked. Though it was concerns of naval strategy and British naval supremacy that established us in the Islands in the first place, both briefly and partially in the years 1765–74, and finally in 1833,lt was surely Britain's importance to Argentina (as trading-partner and investor) that played, along with the Royal Navy, a major role in ensuring that this peculiar and long-running dispute was for nearly 150 years peacefully conducted. It was not in Argentina's interest to sharpen it over-much. Since the Second World War those interests which weighed against the more forceful pressing of their claim were progressively weakened.